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VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 
OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
M. H. KAPLAN and BERNARD GLASSER, ) 
) 
Complainants, ) 
v~ ) IN 
) · CHANCERY 
ROBERT D. RUFFIN, Trustee, and ) 
RICHARD W. RUFFIN, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
AMENDED BILL FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
To the Honorable Judge of said Court: 
Your complainants, M. H. Kaplan and Bernard Glasser, 
respectfully represent: 
1. That on February 18, 1966, they obtained in this 
Honorable Court a judgment against Maurice E. Collette in the 
amount of $7,741.41 on a certain promissory note, and this 
judgment was on the same date duly docketed in the Clerk's 
Office of the Corporation Court of this City, in Judgment 
Docket Book 48, page 298, which judgment bears interest at 
the rate of 6 per cent per annum from December 1, 1965, 
$774.14 attorney's fees, and $22.25 costs. 
2. The complainants aver that there is a present balance 
due them on thio judgment of $6,082.11, with interest at the 
rate of 6 per cent per annum from January 6, 1967, $774.14 
attorney's fees, and $22.25 costs. 
3. The complainants aver that on May 10, 1963, recorded 
in the last mentioned Clerk's Office, in Deed Book 936, page 
25, Maurice E. Collette executed a deed of trust on the 
property designated as 1407 and 1409 West 46th Street, 
Norfolk, Virginia, to Robert D. ·Ruffin, Trustee, to secure a 
note of even date therewith for $4,000.00, and which deed of 
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trust recited that the property, 1407 West 46th Street, was 
subject to a prior deed of trust hearing date November 2, 1961, 
and recorded in said Clerk's Office, in Deed Hook 881, page 
147, from Robert H. Crews, unmarried, to J.E. Hall, Jr., et als, 
Trustees of Southern Aid Life Insurance Company, securing a 
note in the original amount of $8,500.00; and 1409 West 46th 
Street was subject to a prior deed of trust bearing date 
September 28, 1961, and recorded in said Clerk's Office, in 
Deed Book 879, page 545, from Kansie Silver, et ux, to J.E. 
Hall, Jr., et als, Trustees of Southern Aid Life Insurance 
Company, securing a note in the original amount of $8,500.00. 
4. The complainants aver that on .March 8, 1967, Robert 
D. Ruffin, Trustee, pursuant to an advertisement in Norfolk 
Virginian Pilot, sold at public auction the aforedescrihed 
property pursuant to the terms of the deed of trust executed by 
Maurice E. Collette on May 10, 1963, recorded in Deed Book 
936, page 25, above referred to, and the City of Norfolk was 
the last and highest bidder at the price of $17,750.00. 
5. The complainants aver that the City of Norfolk paid to 
the said Robert D. Ruffin, Trw~tee, the sum of $17,750.00, 
being the City's hid at the foreclosure sale, and it then became 
the duty of the said Trustee to distribute the proceeds in 
accordance with law to the parties entitled thereto. 
6. Your complainants aver that the note secured by the 
deed of trust foreclosed by said Trustee was for the sum of 
$4,000.00 payable to the order of hearer at the Seaboard 
Citizens National Bank of Norfolk, Virginia, in monthly 
installments of $500.00, and the amount, if any, due thereon is 
unknown to your complainants. Your complainants have been 
advised by counsel for Robert D. Ruffin, Trustee, that the 
holder of said $4,000.00 note was Richard W. Ruffin, who is 
made a party defendant herein. 
7. Your complainants aver that as judgment lien creditors 
of Maurice E. Collette, which was subsequent to the deed of 
trust of Robert D. Ruffin, Trustee, which was foreclosed as 
aforesaid, and the next lien of record, made demand on the 
Trustee for the excess proceeds over and above the amount due 
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on the note that was foreclosed, and payment has not to date 
been received, as said Trustee averred that he paid the excess 
proceeds to Southern Aid Life Insurance Company, the holder 
of the prior deed of trust of record rather than to your 
complainants, who were the judgment creditors holding the 
next lien in priority to the proceeds of sale. 
8. Your complainants aver that inasmuch as Maurice E. 
Collette executed a second deed of trust on the subject 
property to Robert D. Ruffin, Trustee, only the mortgagor's 
equity of redemption was conveyed and nothing more, and the 
Trustee was limited to the sale of the equity of redemption 
when he foreclosed and sold the property under his second deed 
of trust. The excess proceeds over and above the amount due on 
the second deed of trust lien inured to the benefit of your 
complainants, whose lien of their judgment was next in priority. 
Your complainants contend that they are entitled to receive 
the excess proceeds from the foreclosure sale after the actual 
amount due and owing on the second deed of trust has been 
satisfied. The Trustee, however, contends that Southern Aid 
Life Insurance Company is entitled to the proceeds rather than 
your complainants. Your complainants, however, aver that in 
accordance with the law well established in cases of this kind as 
set forth in Seward v. New York Life Insurance Company, 154 
Va. 154 [page 165], the complainants are entitled to the 
proceeds. 
9. The complainants further aver that they, who were the 
subsequent lien creditors of record, and entitled Lo the excess 
proceeds of sale, at no time consented to the Trustee's 
application of any part of the proceeds of said sale to Southern 
Aid Life Insurance Company, or to any other person. 
WHEREFORE, since an actual controversy exists between 
your complainants and the defendants, Robert D. Ruffin, 
Trustee, and Richard W. Ruffin, and antagonistic assertions and 
denial of rights between the parties hereto exist, and the parties 
hereto are adversely affected, your complainants pray that this 
Honorable Cour enter a declaratory judgment adjudicating the 
rights of the parties hereto in accordance with Section 8-578 of 
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the 1950 Code of Virginia, as amended, and to grant to your 
complainants all such further relief as may be necessary and 
proper. 
M. H. KAPLAN and BERNARD GLASSER 
By /s/ RichardS. Glasser 
Counsel 
RichardS. Glasser, p.q. 
504 Plaza One 
Norfolk, Virginia 23510 
I certify that a copy of this Amended Bill for Declaratory 
Judgment was on this 12th day of January, 1968, forwarded to 
W.L. Parker, Esq., attorney for Robert D. Ruffin, Trustee, 
Virginia National Bank Building, Norfolk, Virginia, and Richard 
W. Ruffin, Citizens Bank Building, Norfolk, Virginia. 
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Is/ RichardS. Glasser 
Richard S. Glasser 
VIRGINIA: 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
M. H. KAPLAN and BERNARD GLASSER, 
Complainants, 
v. 
ROBERT D. RUFFIN, TRUSTEE, and 
RICHARD W. RUFFIN, 
Defendants. 
DECREE OF REFERENCE 
IN 
CHANCERY 
DOCKET 
N0.4234 
This cause came on this day to be heard, upon the 
Amended Bill of Complaint, and the Answer of the defendants 
Robert D. Ruffin, Trustee, and Richard W. Ruffin, thereto; and 
upon the motion of the complainants, pursuant to Rule 4: 1 and 
Rule 4:9 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
VirgiRia, for an order requiring the defendants to appear for 
discovery depositions and to produce and permit the plantiffs 
to inspect, copy, and/ or photograph documents, instruments, 
records, books of account, correspondence, notes, and other 
memoranda. Upon consideration whereof, the Court having 
considered the allegations of the Amended Bill of Complaint 
and the Answer of the defendants thereto, and being of opinion 
that no issue of fact arises on the pleadings, doth overrule said 
motion, to which action of the Court the complainants, by 
counsel, objected and excepted. 
And thereupon, the defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss 
the Amended Bill of Complaint, in response to which, the 
complainants filed a Motion to Quash the same. The Court took 
no action on said Motion to Dismiss, and said Motion to Quash, 
hut reserved consideration thereof for a later date. 
It appearing to the Court that the sole issue in this cause is 
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whether .or not Robert D. Ruffin, Trustee, has properly applied 
the proceeds of sale of the property sold by him pursuant to the 
terms of the Deed of Trust in the Amended Bill of Complaint 
mentioned and described, the Court doth 
ADJUDGE, ORDER, and DECREE, that this cause he 
referred to James· M. Robertson, one of the Commissioners in 
Chancery of this Court, who is directed to hear evidence and to 
make, state, and settle a report showing what disposition 
Robert D. Ruffin, Trustee, made of the proceeds of sale of the 
property sold by him pursuant to the terms of a Deed of Trust 
from Maurice E. Collette to Robert D. Ruffin, Trustee, of 
record in the Clerk's Office of the Corporation Court of the 
City of Norfolk, Virginia, in Deed Book 936, at page 25, in the 
Amended Bill of Complaint more particularly described; and 
whether or not the said Robert D. Ruffin, Trustee, applied the 
proceeds of said sale according to law. And the said Com-
missioner in Chancery shall make due report of his proceedings 
hereunder to the Court. 
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VIRGINIA: 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
M. H. KAPLAN and ) 
BERNARD GLASSER, ) 
Complainants, ) 
) 
~ ) 
) 
ROBERT D. RUFFIN, Trustee, and ) 
RICHARD W. RUFFIN, ) 
Defendants. ) 
IN 
CHANCERY 
DOCKET 
N0.4234 
REPORT OF COMMISSIONER IN CHANCERY 
To the Honorable Judges of said Court: 
Pursuant to the Decree of Reference entered in the above 
entitled suit on the 4th day of March, 1968, the undersigned, 
1 ames M. Robertson, Commissioner in Chancery for this Court, 
to whom said suit was referred, did proceed to execute said 
Decree on the 27th day of February, 1969, at 11:00._o'clock 
A.M. in the offices of the Commissioner, Citizens Bank Building 
in the City of Norfolk, Virginia, notice of the time and place of 
the execution of said Decree having been duly accepted by 
counsel of record for all the parties to this proceeding, which 
notice, with the acceptance of service noted thereon, is attached 
to the transcript of the depositions and returned herewith. 
In the hearing before the Commissioner, the parties 
appeared by their counsel and Glasser and defendant, Robert D. 
Ruffin, were present in person, which will more fully appear by 
reference to the transcript of the depositions which, together 
with the exhibits, are returned herewith. The complainants 
submitted eleven (11) exhibits which were duly marked and the 
defendants submitted thirteen ( 13) exhibits which were duly 
marked. 
9 
By the terms of the Decree of Reference, the Com-
missioner was directed to inquire into and report to the Court 
on two separate questions, as will hereinafter more fully appear. 
Counsel for complainants submitted a ~Iemorandum of 
Argument and Authority on their behalf and counsel for the 
defendants submitted a Memorandum of Argument and 
Authority on their behalf and Defendants' Reply to Com-
plainants' Memorandum of Argument and Authority. These 
memoranda fully treat the law controlling the case. They are 
returned herewith. 
After an analysis of the pleadings, an examination of the 
depositions and exhibits and the memoranda submitted by 
counsel, and upon due consideration thereof, your Com-
missioner respectfully reports as follows: 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Complainants filed their Amended Bill for Declaratory 
judgment alleging that they were judgment creditors of Maurice 
E. Collette, that Robert D. Ruffin, as trustee under a second 
deed of trust from Collette, which he foreclosed, improperly 
paid to Richard \V. Ruffin, the holder of the note secured by 
the second deed of trust, from the proceeds of the foreclosure 
sale, the amount paid by Richard W. Ruffin in discharge of 
prior deeds of trust on the foreclosed property, that the funds 
should not have been paid to Richard W. Ruffin, but should 
have been applied in payment to them of the amount due on 
their judgment, which was docketed subsequent to the recorda-
tion of the second deed of trust. 
Defendants, in their Answer, invoke the doctrines of 
subrogation and unjust enrichment and allege that Richard W. 
Ruffin was subrogated to the rights of the holder of the prior 
deeds of trust and was entitled to be first paid from the 
proceeds of the foreclosure sale. 
THE FACTS 
By deed dated October 18, 1961, and recorded on 
November 2, 1961, in the Clerk's Office of the Corporation 
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Court of the City of Norfolk in Deed Book 881, page 146, 
Robert H. Merriman and Alma Merriman conveyed to Robert 
H. Crews certain property situated in the City of Norfolk, with 
the improvements thereon numbered 1407 W. 46th Street, 
designated as Lot 27 and the eastern 15 feet of Lot 28. in Block 
104 on the plat of The Investment Company of Norfolk, which 
is recorded in the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of Norfolk 
County, Virginia, in Map Book 3, page 76. (Dep. pp. 5,6). 
By deed of trust dated November 2, 1961, and recorded 
on November 2, 1961, in the first mentioned Clerk's Office in 
Deed Book 881, page 147, Robert H. Crews, unmarried, 
conveyed to J .E. Hall, Jr. and H.H. Southall, Trustees, the 
property numbered 1407 W. 46th Street in trust to secure the 
payment of a note in the amount of $8,500.00, of even date 
with said deed of trust, made by said Robert H. Crews, bearing 
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum payable to 
Bearer at Southern Aid Life Insurance Company, Inc., Rich-
mond, Virginia, in monthly installments of $68.00 each, 
beginning on December 2, 1961, said payments to he applied 
first to interest and the balance, if any, to principal, with the 
privilege of making larger payments on any installment date 
after one year from date, with rebate of unearned interest. (Def. 
Ex 11). 
By deed dated November 7, 1961, and recorded on 
January 29, 1963, in said Corpor~tion Court Clerk's Office in 
Deed Book 925, page 602, said Robert H. Crews, unmarried, 
conveyed to Robert H. Merriman and Alma Merriman the 
property numbered 1407 W. 46th Street. (Dep. pp. 7,8). 
By deed dated September 28, 1961, and ·recorded on 
October 16, 1961, in said Corporation Court Clerk's Office in 
Deed Book 879, page 544, Robert H. Merriman and Alma B. 
Merriman conveyed to Kensie Silver and Dorothy M. Silver 
(erroneously referred to throughout the depositions as Silver-
man) certain property situated in the City of Norfolk, with the 
improvements thereon, numbered 1409 W. 46th Street desig-
nated as Lot 29 and the Eastern 10 feet of Lot 28 in Block 104 
on said plat of The Investment Company of Norfolk. (Dep. p. 
6). 
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By deed of trust dated October 16, 1961, and recorded on 
October 16, 1961, in said Clerk's Office in Deed Book 879, 
page 545, said Kensie Silver and Dorothy M. Silver conveyed to 
}.E. Hall, Jr. and H.H. Southall, Trustees, the property 
numbered 1409 W. 46th Street in trust to secure the payment 
of a note in the amount of $8,500.00, of even date with the 
deed of trust, made by Kensie Silver and Dorothy M. Silver, 
bearing interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum, 
payable to Bearer at Southern Aid Life Insurance Company, 
Inc., Richmond, Virginia, in monthly installments of $68.00 
each, beginning November 16, 1961, said payments to he 
applied first to interest and the balance to principal, with the 
privilege of making larger payments on any installment date 
after one year from date, with rebate of unearned interest. (Def. 
Ex. 10). 
By deed dated October 20, 1961, and recorded on january 
29, 1963, in said Clerk's Office in Deed Book 879, page 605, 
said Kensie Silver and Dorothy M. Silver conveyed to Robert H. 
Merriman and Alma M. Merriman the property numbered 1409 
W. 46th Street. 
By deed dated May 10, 1963, and recorded on May 10, 
1963, in said Clerk's Office in Deed Book 936, page 23, Robert 
H. Merriman and Alma M. Merriman conveyed to Maurice E. 
Collette the two parcels of property situated in the City of 
Norfolk numbered 1407 and 1409 W. 46th Street respectively. 
(Dep. p. 1 0). 
This conveyance was made subject to the two above 
mentioned deeds of trust on said property. 
By deed of trust dated May 10, 1963, and recorded May 
10, 1963, in said Clerk's Office in Deed Book 936, page 25, 
Maurice E. Collette, unmarried, conveyed to Robert D. Ruffin, 
Trustee, the two parcels of property numbered 1407 and 1409 
W. 46th Street in trust to secure the payment of a note in the 
amount of $4,000.00, of even date with said deed of trust, 
made by said Maurice E. Collette, bearing interest at the rate of 
six percent (6%) per annum payable semi-annuaiJy, payable to 
Bearer 15 months after date, which said note bears the notation 
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"This note will be extended from month to month on the 
payment each month of $500.00 on account of principal until 
paid in full." This deed of trust recites that it is made subject to 
the two above mentioned deeds of trust to Hall and Southall, 
Trustees, on the two parcels of property respectively. (Plt. Ex. 
6). 
In january, 1967, the above mentioned notes in the 
amount of $8,500.00 each, secured by the above mentioned 
deeds of trust to Hall and SouthaU, Trustees, were held by 
Southern Aid Life Insurance Company, Inc. It is not clear 
whether payment on these notes was then in default. It is clear 
that these notes previously had been in default on numerous 
occasions, and were from time to time paid to date only after 
threat of foreclosure. 
In January, 1967, the above described note in the amount 
of $4,000.00 secured by the deed of trust to Robert D. Ruffin, 
Trustee, was held by Richard W. Ruffin, the brother of Robert 
D. Ruffin, both of whom are lawyers, who practice in 
partnership under the firm name of EdmundS. Ruffin & Sons. 
This note was in default, in fact, had been in default since the 
first installment of interest was due thereon on November 10, 
1963 .. Nothing was paid on account of interest or principal from 
the time the note was made. (Dep. p. 33). 
The other liens of record against said property in January, 
1967, and on March 14, 1967, the date of the recordation of 
the hereinafter mentioned foreclosure deed to the City of 
Norfolk were: 
judgment of Arthur L. Barge v. Maurice E. Collette 
rendered on November 5, 1965, by the Court of Law and 
Chancery of the City of Norfolk, docketed in the Clerk's Office 
of the Corporation Court of said City on January 3, 1966, in 
judgment Docket 48, page 267, for $3,500.00 with interest at 
the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from November 15, 
1965, plus $350.00 attorney's fees and costs. J. Hugo Madison 
is attorney for the plaintiff. (Plf. Ex. 5). On February 19, 1969, 
Mr . .Madison wrote Mr. Bernard Glasser that the balance due on 
this judgment was $1,400.00. (Plf. Ex. 3). 
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Judgment of M. H. Caplan and Bernard Glasser v. Maurice 
E. Collette rendered on February 18, 1966, by said Court of 
Law and Chancery docketed in said Corporation Courf Clerk's 
Office on February 18, 1966, in judgment Docket 48, page 
298, for $7 ,741.42, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) 
per annum from December I, 1965, plus $774.14 attorney's 
fees and $22.25 costs. (Plf. Ex. 4). The balance due on this 
judgment at the time of the hearing was $5,646,12 plus interest 
from April15, 1968. (Dep. p. 3). 
Complainant's witness, S. D. Glasser, stated that he 
recalled that there were later judgments docketed against 
Collette of which he had no record. These judgments as of 
December 21, 1967, are described in plaintiffs' Exhibit 5. It will 
he observed that all of the judgments described in this exhibit, 
save those in behalf of Barge, and Caplan and Glasser, were 
obtained and docketed subsequent to the foreclosure, the 
recordation of the foreclosure deeds and the disbursement of 
the proceeds of the foreclosure sale, all of which will fully 
hereinafter appear (Dep. pp. 13, 14, 32, 33. Plf. Exs. 1, 2, 7, 8, 
Def. Ex. 13). The Commissioner is of the opinion that the 
judgments obtained and docketed after the recordation of the 
foreclosure deed to the City of Norfolk did not become liens 
against the foreclosed property, title to which was then vested 
of record in the City of Norfolk and are immaterial and 
irrelevant to this proceeding. 
It is common knowledge, of which the Commissioner takes 
judicial notice, that during the period 1963, and possibly 
earlier, to january, 1967, that Old Dominion College, now Old 
Dominion University, had puhlically announced its intention of 
expanding southwardly from its then campus into the area 
which includes the above described property. It was also 
common knowledge, of which the Commissioner takes judicial 
notice, that the City of Norfolk had announced a policy of 
acquiring the property in this area for the purpose of holding it 
for the benefit of the college. Both the college, an instru-
mentality of the Commonwealth, and the City of Norfolk 
possess the power of eminent domain. Following the public 
announcement of the plans of the college and the policy of the 
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City, the real estate market for property in this area became 
depressed to a point where it was practically non-existent, a 
well known phenomenon which follows announcement by 
public bodies that they intend to acquire property for public 
use in a certain area. 
Robert D. Ruffin was the sole witness for defendants. He 
testified that many efforts were made to find purchasers for this 
property in order to protect the holder of the note secured by 
the deed of trust to him, as trustee, all without success. 
In January, 1967, the Ruffins learned that the City of 
Norfolk was interested in acquiring the property, that it had 
been appraised for $17,750.00, and that the City was willing to 
pay this amount for it. 
They then communicated with Collette, informed him of 
the City's willingness to purchase the property for $17,750.00 
and insisted that he sell to the City for this sum rather than 
become involved in condemnation proceedings which would 
probably::,result in less funds being available to pay the second 
mortgagee. Collette executed an option on January 24, 1967, 
agreeing to sell the property to the City of $17,750.00. (Def. 
Ex. 1). 
By the terms of the option agreement Collette agreed to 
convey the property. "free of all liens and encumbrances, except 
real estate taxes for the current year which shall be pro-rated to 
the date of settlement and paid by the undersigned (Collette)." 
On January 31, 1967, the City of Norfolk exercised said 
option. (Def. Ex. 2). 
Following the exercise of the option, Mr. Robert Ruffin 
informed the City Attorney that there were judgment liens 
against the property and that it would he necessary to foreclose 
in order to eliminate these liens. He told the City Attorney that 
if the City would agree to bid the option price of $17,750.00 
and was the successful bidder, he would cause the release of the 
two prior deeds of trust securing Southern Aid Life Insurance 
Company, Inc. The City agreed to this proposal. (Dep. p. 41). 
Mr. Ruffin then communicated with Mr. Collette and told 
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him that he would charge a trustee's fee of $200.00 which was 
somewhat less than five percent (5%) of the balance which 
would be available after paying the amounts due on the prior 
deeds of trust. By writing dated March 1, 1967 (Def. Ex. 3) 
Collette agreed to the foreclosure of the second deed of trust 
consistent with the understanding between Mr. Ruffin and the 
City and to the $200.00 trustee's commission. 
Thereafter, Mr. Ruffin advertised the property for sale at 
public auction on March 8, 1967, under the second deed of 
trust. The advertisement (Plf. Ex. 7) appeared in the Virginian 
Pilot five times beginning March 4, 1967. This advertisement 
made no mention of prior liens. 
On March 8, 1967, Mr. Ruffin offered the property for 
sale pursuant to the second deed of trust and said advertise-
ment. Prior to offering the property for sale, Mr. Ruffin, as 
trustee, announced that each of the two properties, 1407 W. 
46th Street and 1409 W. 46th Street, was subject to a prior 
deed of trust securing notes held by Southern Aid Life 
Insurance Company, Inc. and he would pay off and release each 
of the deeds of trust from the proceeds of the sale. (Dep. p. 43). 
He then offered the property for sale; there was only one bid, 
that being by the City of Norfolk for $17,750.00 and 
thereupon he sold the property to the City at that figure. Prior 
to advertising the property, Mr. Ruffin received from Southern 
Aid Life Insurance Company, Inc. a letter dated February 22, 
1967 (Def. ex. 5) stating the balance due on 1407 W. 46th 
Street and 1409 W. 49th Street. The combined balances due as 
of March 15th was $13,520.06 and as of March 31st, 
$13,554.52. Immediately following the foreclosure sale, Mr. 
Ruffin mailed a check payable to Southern Aid Life Insurance 
Company, Inc. for $13,520.06. (Def. Exs. 4,6). 
By letter dated March 9, 1967, the company acknowl-
edged receipt of Mr. Ruffin's letter of March 8th enclosing 
check for $13,520.06 in payment of the loans in full. (Def. Ex. 
7). In this letter the company stated that its accountant had 
discovered that Collette was indebted to the company for the 
additional sum of $28.48. A check dated .March 10, 1967, 
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payable to the company in the amount of $28.48 was promptly 
forwarded to the company (Def. Ex. 8). Both of the checks 
were drawn on the account of Edmund S. Ruffin & Sons in the 
Seaboard Citizens National Bank, the first check being signed 
by Robert D. Ruffin and the second check being signed by 
Richard W. Ruffin. The bank account on which these checks 
were drawn was the partnership account of EdmundS. Ruffin 
& Sons, a partnership consisting of Richard W. Ruffin and 
Robert D. Ruffin. Either of the partners could sign checks 
drawn against this account. 
By letter dated March 13, 1967, (Def. Ex. 9) the company 
acknowledged receipt of both checks as payment in full of its 
notes secured by deeds of trust against the respective properties 
and enclosed the respective notes and deeds of trust (Def. Exs. 
10,11). On March 14, 1967, Robert W. Ruffin made marginal 
releases of the two deeds of trust securing the indebtedness to 
Southern Aid Life Insurance Company, Inc. 
Later, on March 14, 1967, the City Attorney handed Mr. 
Ruffin the City of Norfolk's check in the amount of 
$17,750.00 in payment for the property and Mr. Ruffin 
delivered the foreclosure deed (Plf. Ex. 1) which was admitted 
to record on that date. At the time Mr. Ruffin was handed the 
City's check he was also handed a letter dated March 14, 1967, 
from the City of Norfolk signed by Robert D. Holland, 
Assistant City Attorney. This letter, in effect, stated that the) 
delivery of the check was conditioned on payment and release 
of the deeds of trust held by the insurance company. 
Thereafter, Mr. Ruffin executed and delivered to the City 
of Norfolk a Deed of Correction dated March 20, 1967, (Plf. 
Ex. 2) which was recorded on March 24th in Deed Book 1079, 
page 167. (Dep. pp. 13,14). A comparison of the foreclosure 
deed dated March 8, 1967, (Plf. Ex. 1) with this deed discloses 
certain additional language, the pertinent recital being that of 
the $17,750.00 selling price, $13,560.54 was paid to the trustee 
as agent for the City of Norfolk for the purpose of paying off 
and releasing of record the deeds of trust held by the insurance 
company and the balance of $4,189.46 was paid to the trustee 
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to be administered under the terms of the deed of trust securing 
the note held by Richard W. Ruffin. 
While the checks used to pay the notes held by the 
insurance. company were drawn on the account of Edmund S. 
Ruffin & Sons and the larger of the two checks was signed by 
Robert \V. Ruffin, it is uncontradicted that the funds used to 
pay the company were the funds of Richard W. Ruffin. (Dep. p. 
58). 
On March 13, 1967, after receiving the City's check for the 
selling price of the property, Robert D. Ruffin, as trustee, 
reimbursed Richard W. Ruffin, the holder of the second deed of 
trust note, the sum of $13,548.54, which Richard W. Ruffin 
had paid to Southern Aid Life Insurance Company, Inc. in full 
payment of the balance due on the loans secured by first deeds 
of trust on said property. He also paid the expenses of sale, paid 
himself the agreed trustee's fee of $200.00 and paid to Richard 
W. Ruffin as holder of the note secured by the second deed of 
trust on account of the balance due thereon the sum of 
$3, 775.38, which was considerably less than the amount due 
him. (Def. Ex. 13). 
It was admitted that consent to the foreclosure under the 
second deed of trust was not obtained from the holder of the 
notes secured by the first deeds of trust or the judgment lien 
creditors. Consent of the holder of the notes secured by the 
first deeds of trust if required by law was immaterial as the 
notes provided for the right of anticipation. 
By letter of March 15, 1967, Bernard Glasser made 
demand on Robert D. Ruffin for payment of the judgment in 
behalf of M.H. Caplan and himself. (Plf. Ex. 10). 
The foregoing facts may be briefly summarized as follows: 
In January, 1967, Richard W. Ruffin was the holder of a 
note secured by a second deed of trust on which nothing had 
been paid, either interest or principal, and which had been in 
default since November 10, 1963. He and the trustee learned 
that the property had been appraised for the City of Norfolk 
for $17,750.00 and that the City was willing to pay this amount 
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for the property. He knew the approximate balances due on the 
two notes secured by the first deeds of trust on the property. 
He concluded that the price which the City was willing to pay 
was all the property would bring and decided that he should 
prevail upon the maker of the note to accept the City's offer, 
thereby salvaging part of the amount due him. There were 
judgment liens against the property junior to his second deed of 
trust which could not be paid from the proceeds of the sale and 
consequently would remain a lien against the property if the 
property was transferred by the owner. In order to eliminate 
these liens as to this property, he arranged for a foreclosure 
under the second deed of trust securing his note. Immediately 
after the property was bid in by the City, Richard W. Ruffin, 
using his own funds, paid the amounts due on the two notes 
secured by the first deed of trust. This was six days before the 
City paid the trustee the selling price and the trustee delivered 
the foreclosure deed to the City. He did not obtain the consent 
of prior or junior lien holders to this procedure by which he 
Undertook to protect his loan. 
CONTENTION OF PARTIES AND APPLICABLE LAW 
The complainants contend that the course of action 
adopted by the note holder and trustee under the second deed 
of trust is contrary to law, that the trustee sold only the equity 
of redemption and the funds which were used to reimburse 
Richard W. Ruffin for the payment he made to the holder of 
the notes secured by the first deed of trust should have been 
used to pay them and the other judgment lien creditors, 
although these judgment liens were junior to the second deed of 
trust. 
They rely on a statement made by Mr. justice Epps in 
Seward v. New York Life Insurance Company, 154 Va. 154, at 
page 165, which follows: 
". . . where a tract of land is subject to a first and a 
second deed of trust and the equity of redemption 
therein is sold under the second deed of trust, in the 
absence of any directions to the contrary in the second 
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deed of trust, the proceeds of sale are applicable ( 1) to 
the payment of the costs of sale, (2) to the payment in 
full of the debt secured by the second deed of trust, and 
(3) to the payment of any lien debts subsequent in 
priority,. to the second deed of trust of which the 
trustees have knowledge or notice, and any residue of 
the purchase money is payable to the grantor. The 
trustees have no right, power or authority, without the 
consent of the grantor and such subsequent lien 
creditors, if any, to apply any part thereof to the 
payment of the prior deed of trust debt, or to accept 
the assumption of the purchaser of the first lien deed of 
trust debt as a part payment of the purchase price for 
the equity of redemption ... " 
An examination of the facts in the case discloses that this 
pronouncement by Mr. justice Epps was in no way necessary to 
the decision and did not apply to the facts under consideration 
in the case. The plaintiff attempted to hold the defendant, who 
purchased at a foreclosure sale of a second deed of trust 
personally liable for a deficiency on the sale under the first deed 
of trust because the foreclosure deed recited that the purchaser 
assumed the payment of the debt secured by the first deed of 
trust. The Court held that he was not liable. The Court, at page 
161, said: 
"Andrews and Wood, trustees, in making sale under the 
second deed of trust did not offer the "East View" tract 
for sale subject to the first deed of trust, the same to he 
assumed and paid off by the purchaser, nor did they 
offer it for sale free and clear of the lien of the first 
deed of trust, the same to be paid off out of the 
purchase money or assumed by the purchaser as a part 
of the purchase price; and we are not here concerned 
either with the right and authority of the trustees to 
have so offered the property for sale or what would be 
the rights of the parties had it been so offered for sale 
and purchase by Seward." 
In support of his statement on page 165, quoted above, 
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Mr. Justice Epps cited only one Virginia case; the case of Gayle 
v. Wilson, 30 Gratt. (71 V a.) 166. The Court in this case at page 
178 said: 
" ... nothing is better settled than upon the payment of 
the prior mortgage, the junior succeeds by right of 
subrogation to the lien of the former as a security for 
the sum paid even without an assignment." 
A careful examination of Seward and Gayle persuades the 
Commissioner that the dictum pronounced by Mr. Justice Epps 
in Seward does not control the case at bar. 
The complainants further rely on the case of Schmidt v. 
Carneal, 164 Va. 412, and quoted from it at length in their 
Memorandum of Argument and Authority. 
An examination of this case discloses that it was an action 
at law to recover commissions taken by the trustee under a 
second deed of trust on the amount paid by him on the first 
deed of trust from the proceeds of the sale under the second 
deed of trust. The Court at page 415 said: 
"The sole question in this case is whether or not 
defendant, trustee in the second deed of trust, had the 
right to sell and convey legal title to the property 
conveyed to him and charge a trustee's commission on 
the gross proceeds of said sale." 
The Court held that the trustee could not charge commissions 
on the amount paid on the first deed of trust but allowed 
commissions on the balance of the purchase price which 
exceeded the amount due on the second deed of trust. It did 
not concern itself with how the trustee disbursed the proceeds 
of the sale or whether or not he acted improperly in paying the 
first deed of trust. It appears that the Court found no fault with 
the trustee having paid the amount due on the first deed of 
trust despite the language from the case quoted by com-
plainants. The Commissioner is of the opinion that Schmidt, on 
its facts, does not control the case at bar. 
The defendants rely upon the agreement with the City of 
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Norfolk t~at they would cause the prior liens held by Soutliern 
Aid Life Insurance Company, Inc. to be paid in full and 
released, the advertisement of the sale without making it subject 
to prior liens, the statement by the trustee at the sale that there 
were~ prior liens which would be paid from the proceeds of the 
sale and the actual payment to the Southern Aid Life Insurance 
Company, Inc., holder of the prior liens, of the full amount 
secured thereby, by Richard W. Ruffin, the holder of the note 
secured by the second deed of trust prior to the payment by the 
City of the sales price and the delivery of the foreclosure deed 
to it. They contend that under these circumstances that Richard 
W. Ruffin was subrogated to the rights of the insurance 
company and that the liens held by the insurance company 
attached in his behalf to the proceeds of the sale prior to all the 
claims except costs incident to foreclosure. 
The course of action pursued by the defendants was 
adopted in order to eliminate the necessity of condemnation, 
the time required for condemnation proceedings which would 
delay payment to the holder of the second deed of trust note, 
the possibility of a lower award upon condemnation and the 
costs incident to condemnation, which could substantially 
reduce the amount available for the holder of the second deed 
of trust note. 
This course of action has in no respect worsened the 
position of complainants. Had they believed the property to be 
of greater value than it brought at foreclosure, they would have 
bid at the sale. The complainants obtained their judgment on 
February 18, 1966, more than a year prior to the sale. Had they 
believed that the property was of sufficient value to pay off all 
prior liens and their judgments, they could have· brought a 
creditor's suit to enforce the lien of their judgment. 
In lieu of following remedies available to them, they 
silently stood by and permitted the defendants to pursue the 
action of which they now complain. The complainants would 
reject the equitable doctrines of subrogation and unjust 
enrichment on the theory that the Commissioner is not required 
by the Decree of Reference to report whether these doctrines 
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are applicable to this case. This is indeed difficult to apprehend, 
as complainants have proceeded on the equity side of the Court. 
They further would have the Commissioner disregard these 
well established equitable doctrines because the defendants 
were "well versed in the law." It is indeed strange that one 
would advocate one set of rules for those trained in the law and 
another set for the untrained. This, the Commissioner must 
reject on constitutional grounds. 
The right of a junior lienor to protect his lien is well stated 
in 1 Glenn on Mortgages, Sec. 39.3(c), p. 259, as follows: 
"(c) The final remedy of the junior lienor is to take 
over the first mortgage. The term, "take over," as here 
used, emphasizes the point that the junior lienor's right 
is to keep the mortgage alive, as against the mortgagor, 
rather than to discharge it, and so, even if the junior 
lienor, through mistake, discharges the mortgage, an 
equity. court will relieve by treating the mortgage as still 
alive, with the junior lienor subrogated to its benefits. 
The junior lienor, therefore, is entitled, upon payment 
to the mortgagee of the sum due, to hold the land 
subject to two liens, first, for the sum laid out by him in 
paying off the mortgage, and second, for the amount of 
his own lien." 
The statement by Professor Glenn is fully supported in 59 
C.J .S. Mortgages, Sec. 797, p. 1524, as follows: 
"Sec. 797. Reimbursement for Preseroation of Security 
A mortgagee may be reimbursed out of the proceeds of 
the sale for moneys necessarily expended by him in 
preseroing the securi(y. 
Out of the proceeds of a foreclosure sale the mortgagee 
is entitled to claim reimbursement for moneys neces-
sarily expended by him for the preservation of the 
property or of his security on it, including the amount 
paid for the purchase of outstanding and superior liens 
or charges, such as judgments, other mortgages, or 
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mechanics' liens, for the discharge of taxes on the 
premises, and, where so authorized by the mortgagee, 
for insurance on .the buildings on the mortgaged land." 
This is the law of Virginia. The Commissioner repeats the 
language contained in Gayle v. Wilson, Supra, quoted above 
which follows: 
" ... nothing is better settled than upon the payment of 
the prior mortgage, the junior succeeds by right of 
subrogation to the lien of the former as a security for 
the sum paid even without an assignment." 
Defendants' counsel, in his Memorandum of Argument and 
Authority, quotes language from Hudson v. Dismukes, et al, 77 
Va. 242 and Bankers Loan & Investment Co. v. Hornish, 94 Va. 
608. In both of these cases, the Court applied the doctrine for 
subrogation in behalf of persons paying off debts of others in 
order to protect their liens. 
ANSWER TO THE INQUIRIES 
The Commissioner reports that Robert D. Ruffin, Trustee, 
made the following disposition of the proceeds of sale of the 
property sold by him pursuant to the terms of a deed of trust 
from Maurice E. Collette to Robert D. Ruffin, Trustee, of 
record in the Clerk's Office of the Corporation Court of the 
City of Norfolk, Virginia, in Deed Book 936, page 25: 
To Virginian Pilot, advertisement 
To U.S. Revenue stamps on deed of bargain and 
sale 
To Trustee's commission, reduced as agreed 
To fee for drawing deed of bargain and sale 
To City Treasurer, 2-1/2 months of 1st quarter 
1967 taxes 
To William L. Ward, Commissioner of Accounts 
To Richard W. Ruffin, reimbursement of the 
amount paid by him to Southern Aid Life 
24 
$ 101.90 
19.80 
200.00 
15.00 
52.38 
25.00 
Insurance Company, Inc. in full payment of 
the note dated October 16, 1961, secured by 
deed of trust on 1409 W. 46th Street in the 
City of Norfolk, Virginia, from Kensie Silver 
and Dorothy 1\tl. Silver to j .E. Hall, Jr. and 
H.H. Southall, Trustees, duly recorded as 
hereinabove set out and in full payment of 
the note dated November 2, 1961, secured by 
deed of trust on 1407 W. 46th Street, in the 
City of Norfolk, Virginia, from Robert H. 
Crews to j .E. Hall, Jr. and H.H. Southall, 
Trustees, duly recorded as hereinabove set out 
and for the cost of releasing said deeds of 
trust 13,560,54 
To Richard W. Ruffin, holder of note of 
$4,000.00 secured by deed of trust to Robert 
D. Ruffin, Trustee, as aforesaid, on account 
of balance due thereon 3, 775.38 
TOTAL $17,750.00 
The Commissioner further reports that said Robert D. 
Ruffin, Trustee, applied the proceeds of the sale under the 
second deed of trust according to law. 
The Commissioner regrets the delay in completing his 
report. The Court is aware of his long association and friendship 
with Messrs. Glasser and Ruffin. This made the task more 
unpalatable. Much more time was actually spent by the 
Commissioner than would have been spent by a person 
uninhibited by such circumstances. The Commissioner is re-
luctant to fix his fee and respectfully requests the Court to 
award him such fee as may to it seem right and proper. 
In compliance with Section 8-256 of the Code of Virginia 
of 1950 as amended, the Commissioner certifies that on or 
before the date upon which this report was returned to Court, 
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he gave notice thereof in writing to all parties who have 
appeared in the cause or to their counsel of record by mailing a 
copy of said notice to their last known residences or Post Office 
addresses. 
Respectfully submitted this 27th day of May, 1971. 
Is/ .lames M. Robertson 
Commissioner in Chancery 
Court Reporter's fee 
(.J aimc & Browning) $91.25 
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VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 
OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
M. H. KAPLAN and ) 
BERNARD GLASSER, ) 
Complainants ) 
v. ) 
) 
ROBERT D. RUFFIN, Trustee, and ) 
RICHARD W. RUFFIN, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
IN 
CHANCERY 
DOCKET 
NO. 4234 
EXCEPTIONS TO REPORT OF COMMISSIONER 
IN CHANCERY 
M. H. Kaplan and Bernard Glasser, Complainants, file the 
following Exceptions to the Report of the Commissioner in 
Chancery on the following grounds: 
1. Complainants except to the Report of the Com-
missioner in Chancery wherein he reports that the Defendant, 
Robert D. Ruffin, Trustee, applied the proceeds of the sale 
under the. second Deed of Trust according to law, for the reason 
that such was contrary to the law and the evidence. 
The sum of $17,750.00 was received by the Trustee for 
this property at the foreclosure sale and he was required by law, 
after the payment of the costs of sale and the payment of the 
debt secured by the second Deed of Trust under which he sold, 
to apply the excess and residue to the payment of the 
Complainants' judgment, irrespective of the arrangements which 
the Trustee made prior to the sale without the assent of the 
Complainants. The fact that the Trustee had pre-arranged with 
the mortgagor to sell this property to the City at $17,750.00, 
and to accomplish this by foreclosing on the second Deed of 
Trust, eould not legally cut off the Complainants' rights to the 
excess for the reason that the Trustee could not do indirectly 
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what he could not do directly. At the time of the foreclosure, 
the only amount due and owing to the Defendant, Richard W. 
Ruffin, was on the $4,000.00 note secured by said second Deed 
of Trust. Richard W. Ruffin did not become the holder of the 
first Deed of Trust notes until after the foreclosure had taken 
place, and after the Complainants' rights to the excess proceeds 
derived from the foreclosure under the second Deed of Trust 
had become vested. 
The Complainants were entitled to receive the excess 
proceeds in accordance with the law well established in cases of 
this kind as set forth with particularity in the case of Seward v. 
New York Life Insurance Company, 154 VA 154 (p. 165), 
wherein it is stated: 
" ... where a tract of land is subject to a first and a 
second deed of trust and the equity of redemption 
therein is sold under the second deed of trust, in the 
absence of any directions to the contrrry in the second 
deed of trust, the proceeds of sale are applicable (1) to 
the payment of the costs of sale, (2) to the payment in 
full of the debt secured by the second deed of trust, and 
(3) to the payment of any lien debts subsequent in 
priority to the second deed of trust of which the 
trustees have knowledge or notice, and any residue of 
the purchase money is payable to the grantor. The 
trustees have no right, power or authority, without the 
consent of the grantor and such subsequent lien 
creditors, if any, to apply any part thereof to the 
payment of the prior deed of trust debt, or to accept 
the assumption of the purchaser of the first lien deed of 
trust debt as a part payment of the purchase price for 
the equity of redemption." 
In a subsequent case, Schmidt v. Carneal, 164 Va. 412, 
180 S.E. 325, the Court quoted with approval the decision as 
rendered in the foregoing Seward v. New York Life Insurance 
Company case, and went on further to say (180 S.E. 325 (p. 
326)): 
( 1) "It is well settled that a trustee in a deed of trust 
28 
can only do with the trust property what the deed 
either in express terms or by necessary implication 
authorizes him to do. In other words, the powers of the 
person foreclosing under a mortgage or deed of trust are 
limited and defined by the instrument under which he 
acts, and he has only such authority as is thus expressly 
conferred upon him, together with incidental and 
implied powers that are necessarily included therein. 
Accordingly, the trustee or mortgagee must see that in 
all material matters he keeps within his powers, and 
must execute the trust in strict compliance therewith." 
(2) "As already observed, the deed of trust under which 
the defendant was acting expvessly provided that the 
same was subordinate to the first deed of trust of the 
same date to the Central Trust Company, trustee. Said 
deed of trust, therefore, conveyed only the grantor's 
equity of redemption in the property, and the trustee 
had no power or authority to sell any greater estate, 
nor, without the consent of the grantor and the third 
deed of trust creditor, to use the proceeds derived 
therefrom to pay off the first deed of trust notes." 
The present case is on all fours with the Seward and 
Schmidt cases. 
The Legislature in 1970 amended Section 55-59 (13) of 
the Code of Virginia to incorporate in that Section the law 
enunciated by the above two cases which Section now reads as 
follows: 
55-59. How deed of trust construed; duties, rights, etc., of 
parties. 
(13) The trustee shall receive and receipt for the 
proceeds of sale, no purchaser being required to see to 
the application of the proceeds, and apply the same, 
first, to discharge the expenses of executing the trust, 
including a commission to the trustee of five per centum 
of the gross proceeds of sale; secondly, to discharge all 
taxes, levies, and assessment, with costs and interest, 
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including the due pro rata thereof for the current year; 
thirdly, to discharge in the order of their priority, if 
any, the remaining debts and obligations secured by the 
deed, and any liens of record inferior to the deed of 
trust under which sale is made, with lawful interest; and, 
fourthly, the residue of the proceeds shall be paid to the 
grantor or his assigns; provided, however, that the 
trustee as to such residue shall not be bound by any 
inheritance, devise, conveyance, assignment or lien of or 
upon the grantor's equity, without actual notice thereof 
prior to distribution. 
2. The Complainants further except to the Report of the 
Commissioner in Chancery wherein the Commissioner bases his 
finding for the Defendants on the grounds of subrogation and 
unjust enrichment. The Complainants aver that there was no 
evidence presented to justify the application of either of such 
doctrines and, therefore, the application of such was contrary 
to the law and the evidence. 
There was no evidence whatsoever that the paying off of 
the prior Deeds of Trust by the Defendants was necessary for 
the preservation of the second Deed of Trust. 
The evidence does not justify the application of. the 
doctrine of subrogation and unjust enrichment when the 
Defendants, by their own deliberate maneuvering whereby they 
sought to avoid the payment of the Complainants' judgment 
placed themselves in their present predicament. In 18 .Michies 
Jurisprudence 5 it is stated: 
"Since subrogation is a creature of equity, it must be 
enforced with due regard to the rights, legal or 
equitable, of others. It cannot be invoked so as to work 
injustice or defeat a legal right, or overthrow a superior 
or perhaps even an equal, or displace an intervening 
right or title." 
In 50 American Jurisprudence 742 (Section 97), it is 
stated: 
"One, who having no interest to protect, voluntarily 
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pays off or lends money to pay off an emcumbrance 
without taking an assignment for substitution, cannot 
invoke the doctrine of subrogation in the absence of 
fraud, mistake or some other consideration wherein 
equity can ground its jurisdiction." 
In 50 American Jurisprudence 692 (Section 14), it 1s 
stated: 
uHere, as in other cases, equity follows the law and does 
not supercede it, and so will not declare subrogation in 
violation of a legal right. Where opposing equities arc 
otherwise equal, the one which is prior in point of time 
will be preferred, and where one of two innocent 
persons must suffer a loss, the one whose fault causes 
the exigency must in general bear the loss." 
The Commissioner's finding that the doctrine of subroga-
tion and unjust enrichment is applicable to this case is, 
therefore, contrary to the law and the evidence. 
Respectfully submitted: 
M. H. KAPLAN and BERNARD GLASSER 
By Is/ Bernard Glasser 
Bernard Glasser, p. q. 
Glasser and Glasser 
504 Plaza One 
Norfolk, Virginia 23510 
Counsel 
I certify that a copy of these Exceptions to the Report of 
the Commissioner in Chancery was on this 3rd day of June, 
1971, forwarded to W.L. Parker, Esq., Attorney for Robert D. 
Ruffin, Trustee, and Richard W. Ruffin, Virginia National Bank 
Building, One Commercial Place, Norfolk, Virginia 23510. 
Is/ Bernard G Iasser 
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THIRTY-SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF VIRGINIA 
Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk 
William L. Parker, Esq. 
Virginia National Bank Building 
Norfolk, Virginia 23510 
Bernard Glasser, Esq. 
Glasser & Glasser 
Plaza One 
Norfolk, Virginia 23510 
August 20, 1971 
Re: M. H. Kaplan and Bernard Glasser v. Robert D. 
Ruffin, Trustee, and Richard W. Ruffin 
In Chancery No. 4234 
Gentlemen: 
A detailed recitation of the facts in this case would serve 
no useful purpose; they have been clearly and tersely stated in 
the Memoranda filed by counsel for both parties and in the 
Commissioner's report. It is sufficient to say that Richard W. 
Ruffin was the holder of a $4,000.00 note made by Maurice E. 
Collette which was secured by a second deed of trust dated May 
10, 1963, conveying the subject property to Robert D. Ruffin, 
Trustee. This note was in default from its inception. The 
property conveyed under the second deed of trust was also 
subject to prior deeds of trust dated October 1961, securing an 
indebtedness amounting to (as of date of foreclosure sale) 
$13,548.54 due Southern Aid Life Insurance Co., Inc. The 
complainants are creditors who obtained judgments against 
Collette subsequent to these deeds of trust. 
Ruffin learned that the City of Norfolk was about to 
condemn the subject property and that its appraised value was 
$17,750.00. Concluding that this was a good price for the 
property, he urged Collette to enter into an option with the 
City of Norfolk to sell the property for this price. Collette 
complied. Ruffin then conferred with the City authorities 
advising them of the creditors secured by the deeds of trust and 
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also of the liens of the complainants' judgments. Obviously, the 
appraised value was approximately sufficient to cover the debts 
secured by the several deeds of trust plus the cost of the 
foreclosure, but unless a public auction produced a larger figure 
there would not be sufficient funds derived from the sale to pay 
the judgment creditors. 
Ruffin advised the City of these facts and also of the 
necessity of the foreclosure and sale at public auction in order 
to pass clear title to the City. 
After making arrangements to pay the first deeds of trust, 
Ruffin duly advertised and then sold the property at public 
auction free and clear of all liens. The only bid received at 
public auction was that of the City in the amount of 
$17,750.00. Thereupon, Ruffin paid Southern Aid Life Insur-
ance Co., Inc. the amount of its debt secured by its first deeds 
of trust, received and canceled the notes evidencing this 
indebtedness, released the first deeds of trust and conveyed the 
property to the City of Norfolk free and clear of liens. 
The crux of the complaint is the manner in which Robert 
Ruffin dispersed the funds received from the sale of the 
property at public auction. Upon receipt of the purchase price, 
the Trustee paid the costs of the proceeding, reimbursed 
Richard Ruffin for the amount required to pay off the first 
deeds of trust and applied the balance of the fund to pay the 
$4,000.00 note secured by the second deed of trust. 
The precise question here is whether under these circum-
stances Richard Ruffin should have been reimbursed for the 
amount which he paid to satisfy the first deeds of trust. I must 
resolve this issue in his favor. There is no evidence in this case 
that this property was sold for less than its value, or that the 
complainants were prejudiced hy the sale. They were in the 
unfortunate position of having judgment liens against real . 
property which was already eneumbered to the full extent of its 
value. 
Complainants contend, under authority of Seward v. New 
York Life Insurance Co., 154 V a. 154 and Schmidt v. Carneal, 
164 Va. 412, they should have been paid the amount of their 
judgment liens from the proceeds of the sale before Ruffin was 
repaid the $13,548.54 required to disch~rge the prior indebted-
ness. I cannot agree. These cases are factually dissimilar and do 
not in my opinion support such a conclusion. 
A fee of $750.00 will be awarded the Commissioner in 
Chancery for services rendered pursuant to the order of 
reference. Said fee will be taxed against complainants as part of 
the costs in this case. An appropriate decree will be entered 
upon presentation. 
TMJ:meg 
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Yours very truly, 
/s/ Thomas .M. Johnston 
Thomas M. Johnston 
Judge 
VIRGINIA: 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
M. H. KAPLAN, et al, 
Complainants, 
v. 
ROBERT D. RUFFIN, Trustee, 
et al, 
Defendants. 
FINAL DECREE 
IN 
CHANCERY 
DOCKET 
NO. 4234 
This cause came on this day to be again heard, upon the 
papers formerly read, the Report of .James M. Robertson, 
Commissioner in Chancery, filed in this cause on the 27th day 
of May, 1971, and the Exceptions to said report filed by M.H. 
Kaplan and Bernard Glasser, and was argued by eounsel. 
UPON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, the Court being of 
opinion that Robert D. Ruffin, Trustee, sold the real estate, 
which is the subject matter of this suit, free and dear of liens, 
and received from the City of Norfolk, which made the only bid 
at the trustee's sale, the sum of $17,750, the proceeds of sale; 
that the property was subject to prior liens of Deeds of Trust 
securing an aggregate of $13,548.54, and that the defendant 
Richard W. Ruffin was the lawful holder of that indebtedness; 
that from the proceeds of sale Robert D. Ruffin paid to Richard 
W. Ruffin the sum of $13,548.54 in consideration of the release 
of the Deeds of Trust securing that indebtedness by the 
defendant Richard W. Ruffin, so that the def(~ndant Robert D. 
Ruffin in disbursing the proceeds of sale did so according to 
law, and did not violate any rights of the complainants whose 
Liens were subordinate to the liens of the Deeds of Trust; now 
therefore, for reasons stated in a leller addressed to coun!3el in 
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this cause, by the Judge of this Court, dated August 20, 1971, a 
copy of which is filed with the record, it is 
ADJUDGED, ORDERED and DECREED as follows: 
l. The Exceptions of M.H. Kaplan and Bernard Glasser to 
the Report of James M. Robertson, Commissioner in Chancery, 
are overruled, the Report of the Commissioner is confirmed in 
all respects, and the Bill of Complaint is dismissed. 
2. A fee of $750.00 is awarded James M. Robertson, 
Commissioner in Chancery, for services rendered pursuant to 
the Order of Reference. 
3. The complainants are to pay the costs of this suit, 
including the fee awarded the Commissioner in Chancery. 
Nothing further remaining to be done in this cause, the 
same is ordered stricken from the docket. 
Objected and 
Excepted to: 
Bernard Glasser, p.q. 
Enter: 9/27/71 
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VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 
OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
M. H. KAPLAN, et al, 
Complainants ) 
v. ) 
ROBERT D. RUFFIN, Trustee, et al, ) 
Defendants ) 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
and 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
IN 
CHANCERY 
Docket 
No.4234 
File No. 
C-890-71 
The Complainants, M.H. Kaplan and Bernard Glasser, 
pursuant to Rule 5: l, Section 4, of the Rules of the Supreme 
C')urt of Appeals of Virginia, file herewith Notice of Appeal 
from. the Decree of this Court entered on the 27th day of 
September, 1971. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
The Complainants file the following Assignments of Error: 
l. The Decree entered in this cause is contrary to the law 
and evidence. 
2. The Commissioner in Chancery and Court erred in 
holding that the Trustee applied the proceeds of the sale under 
the second Deed of Trust according to law and did not violate 
any rights of the Complainants whose lien was subordinate to 
the lien of the second Deed of Trust under which the Trustee 
foreclosed. 
3. The Court erred in affirming the Report of the 
Commissioner in Chancery wherein it was held that the 
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decisions rendered in Seward v. New York Life Insurance 
Company 154 Va. 154, and Schmidt v. Carneal 164 Va. 412, 
and which holdings were later incorporated in Section 55-59 
(13) of the Code of Virginia, were not applicable and did not 
control the case at bar. 
4. The Commissioner in Chancery and Court erred in 
holding that the Defendant Trustee could do indirectly which 
he could not do directly. 
5. The Court erred in sustaining the Report of the 
Commissioner in Chancery wherein the Commissioner based his 
findings for the Defendants on the grounds of subrogation and 
unjust enrichment. The Complainants aver that there was no 
evidence presented to justify the application of either such 
doctrine and, therefore, the application of such was contrary to 
the law and the evidence. 
6. The Court erred in allowing the Commissioner in 
Chancery a fee of $750.00 for the reason that said fee is 
excessive and unwarranted. 
M. H. KAPLAN and BERNARD GLASSER 
By Is/ Bernard G Iasser 
Bernard Glasser, p. q. 
Glasser and G Iasser 
504 Plaza One 
Norfolk, Virginia 23510 
Counsel 
I hereby certify that on the 7th day of October, 1971, a 
copy of this Notice of Appeal and Assignments of Error was 
forwarded to William L. Parker, Esquire, Counsel for the 
Defendants, 1235 Virginia National Bank Building, One Com-
mercial Place, Norfolk, Virginia 23510. 
Is/ Bernard Glasser 
Bernard G Iasser 
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VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 
OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK. 
M. H. KAPLAN and ) 
BERNARD GLASSER, ) 
Complainants, ) 
) 
v ) 
) 
ROBERT D. RUFFIN, Trustee, ) 
) 
and ) 
) 
RICHARD W. RUFFIN, ) 
Defendants. ) 
AT LAW 
NO. 4234 
Depositions of witnesses taken before James M. Robert-
son, Commissioner in Chancery, pursuant to Decree of Refer-
ence. and by Notice hereto annexed, at the law offices of the 
Commissioner, Citizens Bank Building, Norfolk, Virginia, at 
11:00 o'clock A.M., February 27, 1969, to be read in evidence 
in the above-entitled cause, pending in the Circuit Court of the 
City of Norfolk. 
APPEARANCES: 
-----oOo-----
Messrs. Glasser and Glasser 
(Mr. Bernard Glasser), 
attorneys for the complaints. 
Mr. William L. Parker, attorney 
for the defendants. 
-----oOo-----
(All witnesses were called and first duly sworn.) 
-----oOo-----
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MAURICE E. ~~LLETTE, called as a witness on behalf of 
the complainants, having been first duly sworn, was examined 
and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GLASSER: 
Q You are Maurice E. Collette? 
A Yes, I am. 
Q And you operate a business at 712 Brambleton 
Avenue, Norfolk, Virginia? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q On February the 18th, 1966, in the Court of Law and 
Chancery of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, M.H. Kaplan and 
Bernard Glasser obtained judgment against you for $7,741.41 
plus interest, attorney's fees and costs; did they not? 
A Yes. 
Q And the plaintiffs say there there is a present balance 
due them of $5,646.12. You do not dispute that amount, do 
you? 
A No. 
Q According to their records that there was $6,082.11 
due them plus interest at the rate of six per cent per annum 
from December 31, 1966, and since that time, on April the 
15th, 1968, they received $435.99 to reduce that sum to 
$5,646.12 plus interest from that date. You are not in a 
position to dispute thar? 
A No. 
Q That is udmitlt~d, am I corn~ct? 
A Yes. 
1\lR. GLASSER: That is all so far as I am concerned. 
MR. PARKER: I have no questions. 
MR. RUFFIN: We may excuse him. 
THE COMMISSIONER: You may be excused. 
And further this deponent saith not. 
-----oOo-----
STUART D. GLASSER, called as a witness on behalf of 
the complainants, having been first duly sworn, was examined 
and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GLASSER: 
Q You arc Stuart I>. Gla~ser'? 
A I am. 
Q And you an~ an attorrwy pradicing law in tht' <·ily ol' 
Norfolk, V iq?;inia? 
A 1 am. 
Q Asso,~iated with (; lassc·r ancl (; las~·wr·~ 
A True. 
Q Did you have oecasion to t~xamine the records in the 
Clt~rk's Office of the Corporation Court of this (;ity as to the 
properly 1407 and 1409 West 46th Street, Norfolk, Virginia'? 
A I have. 
THE COMMISSION r~R: For what period'? 
THE WITNESS: I have spc~':il'ic~ally examined this till'~ 
from a deed dated October 18, 1961 recorded in Deed 
Book 881, Page 146 of the Corporation Court of the City 
of Norfolk, Virginia from Robert H. Merriman and Alma 
Merriman, husband and wife, to Robert H. Crews. 
That particular deed conveyed the property commonly 
known as 1407 West 46th Street. 
In addition to that piece of property -
THE COMMISSIONER: When was that deed re-
corded? 
THE WITNESS: That deed was recorded on Novem-
ber the 2nd, 1961 and it was notarized on October the 
25th, 1961. 
It comprised Lot 27 in the eastern 15 feet of Lot 28 in 
Block 104 of the Plat of the Investment Company of 
Nor folk, which plat is recorded in Map Book 3, at Page 76. 
The property fronts, according to the deed, 40 feet on 
the south side. of 46th Street in the city of Norfolk, 
Virginia, and is 100 feet in depth. 
In addition to that particular parcel of property I have 
started my seareh in reference to 1409 West 46th Street 
with a deed dated September the 28th, 1961 and recorded 
in the Clerk's Offict> of the Corporation Court of the City 
of Norfolk, Virginia on Oetoher 16, 1961 in Deed Book 
879, Page 544. This was a Deed of Bargain and Sale from 
Robert H. Merriman and Alma B. Merriman to Kensie 
Silverman and Dorothy lVI. Silverman, tenants by the 
entireties with right of survivorship to the property, legal 
description of which is Lot 29 in the eastern 10 feet of Lot 
28, Block 104 on the plat of the Investment Company of 
Norfolk recorded in the Clerk's Office in Map Book 3, 
Page 76. 
This lot and a part of a lot front 35 feet on the south 
side of 46th Street - that was the beginning of my search 
in reference to these two parcels of property. 
From that point I went forward and followed the 
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conveyance. The next thing of record on each of these 
parcels were deeds of trust. 
In reference to 1407 West 46th Street there is a deed 
of trust recorded in 881, Page 147 in the aforesaid Clerk's 
Office to j.E. Hall, Jr. and H.H. Southhall, trustees of the 
City of Richmond, Virginia. This was a deed of trust in the 
amount of $8,500 payable to the Southern Aid Life 
Insurance Company, of Richmond, Virginia. 
This deed of trust was released on March the 14th, 
196 7, and I believe that the signature of the noteholder at 
that time, if my reading is correct, was Mr. Robert D. 
Ruffin. 
MR. PARKER: What was the date of that release? 
THE WITNESS: March 14, 1967. And I am not 
positive of the writing of the signature but it appeared to 
be that of Mr. Robert Ruffin. 
Now, in reference - well, let me follow through on 
that same piece of property, 1407 West 46th Street. 
That property was then sold by deed recorded in Deed 
Book 925, Page 602, which deed is dated November 7, 
1961, from Robert H. Crews to Robert H. Merriman and 
Alma Merriman. That deed, as I said, was dated November 
7, 1961 recorded on january the 29th, 1963. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Glasser, you didn't give 
us the date of the deed of trust from Crews to Hall. 
THE WITNESS: That deed of trust was recorded on 
November the 2nd, 1961, which was the same date that 
the deed of trust was dated. 
Further, in reference to the chain on this piece of 
property, 1407 West 46th Street, after it was sold to the 
Mcrrimans, Merriman put a deed of trust on it to Melvin 
Friedman which was released by, I believe again Mr. 
Robert D. Ruffin, on May the 14th, 1963. After that date 
the Merrimans in reference to this piece of property sold 
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this property by deed recorded in Deed Book 936, Page 
23, dated May the lOth, 1963 and recorded on that same 
date to Maurice Collette. 
Also in that same Deed of Bargain _and Sale was 
conveyed the property commonly known as 1409 West 
46th Street, and this particular Deed of Bargain and Sale 
expressly stated that there was an assumption of two deeds 
of trust; namely, deed of trust in 881, Page 147 to J.E. 
Hall and others~ trustees, and also assumption of deed of 
trust recorded in Deed Book 879, Page 545 to J.E. Hall, Jr. 
and H.H. Southhall, trustees. This last deed of trust being 
made by Kensie Silverman and Dorothy M. Silverman and 
being dated October 16, 1961. And this deed of trust -
THE COMMISSIONER: When was that recorded? 
THE WITNESS: Recorded on the same date as dated, 
October 16th, 1961. This deed of trust was also released 
by Mr. Robert D. Ruffin on March 14, 1967. 
Let's see now. Off the record. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
THE WITNESS: In reference to this property com-
monly known as 1409 West 46th Street which Kensie 
Silverman and wife acquired in Deed Book 879, Page 544 
there was a deed of trust dated October the 16th, 1961 
conveyed to J.E. Hall, Jr. and 1-I.H. Southhall in the 
amount of $8,500 to the Southern Aid Life Insurance 
Company, of Richmond, Virginia, and I believe I said 
before that was released on March 14, 1967. Now-
THE COMMISSIONER: That deed of trust was dated 
and recorded when? 
THE WITNESS:. October 16, 1961. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Dated and recorded the same 
date? 
THE WITNESS: The same day, that is correct. 
Now, after Kensie and Alma Merriman conveyed tlwsP. 
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two pieces of property commonly known as 1407 West 
46th Street and 1409 West 46th Street in the same deed 
dated May 10, 1963 to Maurice Collette, Maurice Collette 
by deed of trust of the same date, May 10, 1963, and 
recorded on the same date, gave a deed of trust to Robert 
D. Ruffin, trustee. This deed of trust is recorded in Deed 
Book 936 at Page 25, and it secures a note in the amount 
of - one note in the amount of $4,000 payable fifteen 
months after date at the Seaboard Citizens National Bank, 
plus six per cent interest payable semiannually with 
statement that "this note will be extended from month to 
month on the payment of $500 on each month on account 
of principal until paid in full." 
Now, specifically in reference to this deed of trust 
dated May 10, '63 from Mr. Collette to Mr. Robert D. 
Ruffin, it is stated that this deed of trust - this is not a 
quote but the effect of it is that it is stated that th1s deed 
of trust is made subject to two deeds of trust; namely, the 
deed of trust aforementioned and recorded in 881, Page 
147, and also subject to the deed of trust recorded in 879, 
at Page 545. 
Now, it appears from the record of the Corporation 
Court of the City of Norfolk, Virginia that this deed of 
trust was foreclosed on and there are four foreclosure 
deeds of record. 
The first foreclosure deed from Mr. Robert D. Ruffin, 
trustee, is recorded in Deed Book 1078, Page 410. 
BY MR. GLASSER: 
Q Now, Mr. Glasser, at that point if I may interrupt you 
(Document shown to opposing counsel for examina-
tion.) 
MR. GLASSER: Mr. Commissioner, I would like to 
introduce into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit I a certified 
copy of a foreclosure deed executed by Robert D. Ruffin, 
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~ustee, to the City of Norfolk which is dated March the 
8th, 1967 and recorded in the Clerk's Office of the 
Corporation Court of the city on March 14, 1967 in Deed 
Book 1078 at Page 410. 
THE COMMISSIONER: It is admitted as Com-
plainants' Exhibit Number I. 
MR. PARKER: What is the date of that deed? 
THE COMMISSIONER: March the 8th, 1967. 
(Received and marked in evidence by the Com-
missioner as Complainants' Exhibit Number 1.) 
BY MR. GLASSER: 
Q Mr. Glasser, I hand you herewith Complainants' Ex-
hibit 1 which purports to be the foreclosure deed that was just 
stated and ask you whether you found this duly of record. 
(Exhibit shown to the witness for examination.) 
MR. PARKER: Does the deed show it was recorded? 
MR. GLASSER: Yes. 
MR. PARKER: Well, we can admit that. 
MR. GLASSER: It is conceded that that was re-
corded. 
MR. PARKER: Just give me the deed book reference, 
will you? 
THE WITNESS: My record shows that the deed of 
trust - excuse me - the foreclosure deed dated March 8th, 
'67 from Mr. Ruffin to the City of Norfolk was recorded 
in Deed Book 1078, Page 410 of the Clerk's Office of the 
Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk. 
MR. PARKER: That corresponded to it? 
MR. GLASSER: Yeah. 
MR. PARKER: All right. 
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BY MR. GLASSER: 
Q Now, you said that you found another foreclosure 
deed? 
A I did. 
Q And what is the reference as to that? 
A A second foreclosure deed is recorded in Deed Book 
1079 at Page 167. This foreclosure deed from Mr. Robert D. 
Ruffin, trustee, is dated March the 20th, 1967. It is recorded-
it was recorded on March the 24th, 1967. It also conveys the 
properties commonly known as 1407 and 1409 West 46th 
Street. 
MR. PARKER: It is the identical property. I am 
trying to shorten this down. I think the deeds will speak 
for themselves. I don't think it is necessary to encumber 
the record. We can just concede that there was a second 
correction deed. 
THE WITNESS: That is a second mentioned deed, and 
if the court would like I would he glad to go into the 
difference of the statements that were made in these. 
MR. PARKER: The deeds speak for themselves. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
MR. PARKER: The Commissioner can read them and 
form his own conclusions. 
MR. GLASSER: All right, now-
MR. PARKER: Well, haven't you got the original deed 
there? 
MR. GLASSER: The original would he with the City 
of Norfolk. 
MR. PARKER: What was that that you were -
MR. GLASSER: Judge, this is Exhibit 1. This is 
Exhibit 2. 
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MR. PARKER: No, this was a certified copy and this 
one isn't. Is that correct? 
MR. GLASSER: That is correct, but I just wanted to 
show it to you to see whether or not that is the correct 
copy. 
MR. PARKER: All right, take a look at that and see. 
MR. RUFFIN: That is a copy. Let Mr. Glasser testify 
as to the recordation of this. 
MR. PARKER: This will be Complainants' Exhibit 2 
and that is dated March 20th. 
MR. GLASSER: Yes. 
I would like to introduce into evidence as Com-
plainants' Exhibit Number 2 what purports to be a deed of 
correction from Robert D. Ruffin to the City of Norfolk 
dated March 20, 1967. This is a copy rather than a 
photocopy. 
MR. PARKER: Can you tell me where you.got that 
copy? 
MR. GLASSER: I got that copy from Mr. Robert D. 
Ruffin through the mail. 
MR. PARKER: All right. And where was that re-
corded? 
THE WITNESS: The foreclosure deed from Mr. Ruf-
fin to the City of Norfolk dated March the 20th, 196 7 is 
recorded in Deed Book 1079 at Page 167 in the Clerk's 
Office of the Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk, 
Virginia. 
MR. PARKER: And that is Complainants' Exhibit 
Number 2, I take it? 
MR. GLASSER: Yes, sir. 
MR. PARKER: I have no objection. 
THE COMMISSIONER: The deed was properly exe-
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cuted and acknowledged prior to being admitted to 
record? 
THE WITNESS: That is correct. The deed was 
acknowledged on March the 20th, 1967. 
THE COMMISSIONER: The defendants have no ob-
jection? 
MR. PARKER: No objection. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Admitted and received as 
Complainants' Exhibit 2. 
(Received and marked in evidence by the Com-
missioner as Complainants' Exhibit Number 2.) 
BY MR. GLASSER: 
Q Now, Mr. Glasser, in continuing with your examination 
of the title to these respective parcels, 1407 West 46th Street 
and 1409 West 46th Street, what other liens of record affected 
this property? 
A Number one, there is a judgment lien recorded in 
Judgment Book 48, Page 267 of the Clerk's Office of the 
Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk, Virginia. This 
judgment is styled, Arthur L. Barge v Maurice E. Collette. It is 
dated November the 5th, 1965. It was in the original amount of 
$3,500 plus six per cent interest from November 15, 1965 plus 
$350 as attorney's fees. And Mr. J. Hugo Madison is listed as 
attorney for the plaintiff. 
MR. PARKER: What is the name of the plaintiff? 
THE WITNESS: Arthur L. Barge - "B-a-r-g-e." 
THE COMMISSIONER: On what date was it doc-
keted? 
THE WITNESS: This judgment was docketed on 
January the 3rd, 1966. Excuse me now. I can't tell 
whether this is on January 3rd or January 2nd. It looks to 
me like it is January 3rd from my notes - 1 anuary 3rd, 
'66. 
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MR. PARKER: I have no objection to it. It is my 
contention that these matters are immaterial. 
MR. GLASSER: That is all right. 
BY MR. GLASSER: 
Q Mr. Glasser, before you proceed, did you inquire as to 
what balance if any is due to that judgment of Barge v Collette? 
A I believe that our office received a letter from Mr. 
Madison who is attorney for the plaintiff. This letter is dated 
February the 19th, 1969 and addressed to my father, Bernard 
Glasser, and advises us that the judgment discloses that bhe 
balance due Mr. Barge by Mr. Maurice E. Collette on this 
particular judgment is $1,400. 
MR. GLASSER: If your Honor please, for what it 
might be worth, I would like to introduce this as 
Complainants' Exhibit Number 3. 
THE COMMISSIONER: This is a letter from j. Hugo 
Madison dated February 19, 1969 addressed to Bernard 
Glasser, Esquire, and that will be Complainants' Exhibit 
Number 3. 
(Received and marked in evidence by the Com-
missioner as Complainants' Exhibit Number 3.) 
THE COMMISSIONER: What does the record disclose 
as to any payments on this judgment? 
THE WITNESS: The record did not disclose the 
amounts of any payments. However, certain parcels and 
specific pieces of property had been released from the lien 
of this judgment. In other words there was no general 
release of this judgment hut certain particular pieces of 
property had been released from its lien. 
THE COMMISSIONER: No evidence as to the amount 
if any which was paid for these releases? 
THE WITNESS: My records, which I believe are 
accurate, showed that there was no record on the 
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judgment lien docket as to the amounts that were paid. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Were either of the parcels 
which were foreclosed by Mr. Ruffin released from the 
lien? 
THE WITNESS: No, neither of those two parcels were 
released from that particular lien. 
BY MR. GLASSER: 
Q Now, Mr. G Iasser, what was the next lien in line that 
the records disclosed? 
A The next lien was also a judgment lien. A judgment 
recorded in judgment Book 48, Page 298 in the Clerk's Office 
of the Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, dated 
and recorded on February the 18th, 1966, and the plaintiffs in 
that matter were M.H. Kaplan and B. Glasser. The defendant in 
that matter was Maurice E. Collette. The principal amount of 
the judgment was $7,741.41 plus six per cent interest from 
December the lst, 1965, plus $774.15 attorney's fees and plus 
$22.25 costs. This judgment also - the lien of this judgment 
had also been released as to certain other pieces of real estate, 
piece;:,of real estate other than the two particular pieces that are 
involved today, 1407 and 1409 West 46th Street. 
This judgment was not marked fully paid and satisfied. 
It was not generally released. Now -
MR. GLASSER: At that point I am going to offer in 
evidence the abstract of this judgment, if you will just bear 
with me a second. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Will the abstract disclose the 
release of the properties? 
MR. GLASSER: Yes, sir. I would like to introduce 
into evidence an abstract of the judgment of M.H. Kaplan 
and Bernard Glasser v Maurice E. Collette, which judgment 
was granted on February the 18th, 1966 in the Court of 
Law and Chancery of this city and which is docketed in 
the Clerk's Office of the Corporation Court in Judgment 
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Docket Book 48, at Page 298, and ask that it be permitted 
the introduction as Complainants' Exhibit Number 4. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Any objections? 
MR. PARKER: No objection. 
THE COMMISSIONER: It will be received as Com-
plainants' Exhibit Number 4, the abstract of the judgment 
described by Mr. Glasser. 
(Received and marked in evidence by the Com-
missioner as Complainants' Exhibit Number 4.) 
BY MR. GLASSER: 
Q Mr. Glasser, is this an abstract of the judgment that 
you found in the Clerk's Office? 
(Exhibit shown to the witness.) 
A Yes, it is. 
THE COMMISSIONER: It has been marked as Com-
plainants' Exhibit Number 4. 
THE WITNESS: Mr. Robertson, in reference to your 
question which I have been answering, the period of my 
search, knowing the purpose of my examination of th is 
title, after I got to this lien of record I did not continue on 
to list all of the other judgment liens that were against Mr. 
Collette, and I believe, although I am not saying with 
absolute certainty at this point, that there are some other 
judgments after this one of Mr. M.H. Kaplan and Mr. B. 
Glasser. 
BY MR. GLASSER: 
Q These judgments you have reference to are subsequent 
to these two judgments? 
A That is true. 
Q And these judgments of Barge and Glasser are next in 
line-
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A That is true. 
Q - to the Ruffin deed of trust? 
A That is true. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Well, gentlemen, that poses a 
question for the Commissioner because under the Refer-
ence, among other things the Commissioner is required to 
report on whether or not said. Robert D. Ruffin, trustee, 
applied the proceeds of the sale according to law. 
MR. GLASSER: Mr. Commissioner, I might volunteer 
this information to Judge Parker and the others: That if 
they will permit me we will give ~you a rundown of the title 
complete of all subsequent liens of record, if there be no 
objection. 
MR. PARKER: I have no objection to it. My position 
is, .Mr. Commissioner, that Mr. Richard W. Ruffin as holder 
of the second lien took up the first lien and that the 
proceeds of sale were insufficient to discharge both liens; 
that Mr. Ruffin became subrogated to the first lien, and 
that my position is that so far\ as these subsequent 
judgments are concerned, including Glasser's and Barge's, 
the inquiry is immaterial. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Well, the Commissioner 
understands your position hut he also understands the 
position of the complainants which is to the contrary, and 
if the complainants' view is the law then it is material as to 
subsequent liens. 
MR. PARKER: That is quite true, but as I say I 
simply wanted to point out what my position was. 
THE COMMISSIONER: The Commissioner under-
stands the position of the defendants . 
. MR. GLASSER: Then I understand-
MR. PARKER: I am not particularly concerned about 
these matters. 
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MR. GLASSER: Then I understand you will have no 
objection if I furnish you and the Commissioner with all of 
the subsequent liens of record? 
MR. PARKER: Mr. Ruffin has such an examination 
here which might save you some trouble. 
(Document shown to opposing counsel for examina-
tion.) 
MR. GLASSER: I might say I have no objection to 
your introduction. 
MR. PARKER: I am not introducing it. I am simply 
offering it if you want to use it. You are welcome to it. 
MR. GLASSER: Well, if you have no objection I will 
adopt this. 
MR. PARKER: All right. 
MR. GLASSER: As true certification of the subse-
quent liens of record and introduce that as Complainants' 
Exhibit Number 5. 
MR. RUFFIN: No objection. Is that signed? 
MR. GLASSER: No. 
(Whereupon the document was signed by Mr. Robert 
D. Ruffin.) 
THE COMMISSIONER: The letter addressed to Mr. 
William L. Parker dated November 21, 1967 signed by 
Robert D. Ruffin is received as Complainants' Exhibit 
Number 5. The Commissioner might comment that he 
understands that it has been agreed as between the parties 
that this letter recites the judgments of record in the 
Clerk's Office of the Corporation Court of the City as of 
November 21, 1967. 
MR. PARKER: That is all right. 
MR. GLASSER: (Nodding head affirmatively.) 
(Received and marked in evidence by the Com-
missioner as Complainants' Exhibit Number 5.) 
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BY MR. GLASSER: 
Q Now, Mr. Glasser, going back a minute, the foreclosure 
deed of March the 8th, 1967 indicates that the bid price for this 
property at auction was $17,750. Do you know whether or not 
any of the proceeds of that sale was paid to either of the 
plaintiffs Bernard Glasser or M.H. Kaplan? 
A None of the proceeds were paid to M.H. Kaplan or to 
B. Glasser. 
Q So no part of the proceeds of this sale did either of the 
plaintiffs receive? 
A That is true. Now, you mentioned the one on March 
the 8th, 1967. 
Q And the same would be true on March the 20th, would 
it not? 
A That is also true. 
MR. GLASSER: That is it. 
MR. PARKER: No questions. 
MR. GLASSER: Now, I would like to call Mr. Robert 
D. Ruffin as an adverse witness. 
And further this deponent saith not. 
-----oOo-----
ROBERT D. RUFFIN, a defendant, called as an adverse 
witness, having been first duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION (Adv.) 
BY MR. GLASSER: 
Q You are Robert D. Ruffin? 
A Yes, sir. 
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Q And you are the trustee under the deed of trust that 
was executed by Maurice Collette on May 10, 1963 and 
recorded in the Clerk's Office of the Corporation Court of this 
city in Deed Book 936 at Page 25, are you not? 
A lam. 
Q And that deed of trust secured the property about 
which Mr. Glasser testified? 
A That is correct. 
Q And secured the note of $4,000 of which he testified? 
A That is correct. 
Q And now, do you have that deed of trust with you? 
A I do. 
(Handed to counsel for examination.) 
Q Now, this appears to be the original deed of trust, does 
it not? 
A That is correct. 
Q And naturally it speaks for itself and it shows on its 
face that it was made subject to the two prior deeds of trust of 
$8,500 each to J .E. Hall, Jr. and H.H. Southhall, trustees, is 
that correct? 
A That is correct. 
Q And they were the trustees for the Southern Aid Life 
Insurance Company, of Richmond, is that correct? 
A That is correct. 
MR. PARKER: You might get the exact name. Is that 
the correct name? My recollection is that it has a different 
name. 
THE WITNESS: Southern Aid Life Insurance Com-
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pany, Richmond. 
MR. PARKER: Southern Aid Life Insurance Com-
pany, Incorporated, wasn't it? 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
MR. PARKER: It was not Southern Aid Life Insur-
ance Company of Richmond? 
THE WITNESS: It is located in Richmond. 
MR. PARKER: Located in Richmond. I just want to 
get the correct name of this payee. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Tell me again. 
MR. GLASSER: Let me give it to you. Southern Aid 
Life Insurance Company, Incorporated, and their office is 
in Richmond, Virginia. 
MR. PARKER: Yeah. 
I suggest - I would like to have this introduced in 
evidence before you -
MR. GLASSER: 1 was. 
MR. PARKER: Well, if you will do that I think it 
would simplify things. I will agree to it. 
MR. GLASSER: I would like to introduce into evi-
dence. as Complainants' Exhibit Number 6 the original 
deed of trust about which Mr. Robert D. Ruffin testified 
and the note attached to it. 
THE COMMISSIONER: The deed of trust with the 
note attached will be received as Complainants' Exhibit 
Number 6. This deed of trust shows it was recorded in 
Deed Book 936, Page 25 on May 10, 1963. 
MR. PARKER: Deed Book-? 
THE COM1\USSIONER: 936, Page 25. 
MR. PARKER: 936, Page 25. All right. 
(Received and marked in evidence by the Com-
missioner as Complainants' Exhibit Number 6.) 
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BY MR. GLASSER: 
Q This deed of trust about which you testified provides, 
does it not, even though it speaks for itself, that in the event of 
foreclosure the proceeds shall be paid to the holder of the note 
as the interest may appear after the cost of administration and 
the balance if any to the grantors or their assigns, does it not 
Mr. Ruffin? 
A Yeah. 
(Shown to the witness for examination.) 
Q Okay. Now, did you advertise this property for sale at 
the request of Mr. Richard Ruffin who was the holder of this 
note? 
A Yes. Would you like for me to hand you an adver-
tisement? 
Q Yes, sir. 
A Marked approved by William L. Ward, Commissioner. 
Q And this is the advertisement about which you 
foreclosed this property, is it not? 
A This is the one I inserted in the paper pursuant to 
which I foreclosed on the property. 
MR. GLASSER: I would like to introduce this as 
Complainants' Exhibit Number 7. 
THE COMMISSIONEF: This is a copy of an advertise-
ment headed "Trustee's Sale Number 1407 West 46th 
Street, Number 1409 West 46th Street," attached to a 
statement of the Vi.rginian Pilot for the cost of publica-
tion. It is received as Complainants' Exhibit Number 7. 
(Received and marked in evidence by the Com-
missioner as Complainants' Exhibit Number 7.) 
BY MR. GLASSER: 
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Q This advertisement, which speaks for itself, states that 
the sale was to take place on March the 8th, 1967 in front of 
the Courts Building, 100 St. Pauls Boulevard, Norfolk, Virginia. 
Did you sell the property pursuant to that notice at that time? 
A I did. 
Q And who was the purchaser? 
A The purchaser was the city of Norfolk. 
Q At what price? 
A $17,750. 
Q Now, did any part of the proceeds of this sale go to 
M.H. Kaplan or Bernard Glasser? 
A None. 
Q Did you have any consent from them or assent from 
either one of them to sell this property? 
A I had no such consent or assent. 
Q You had no assent or consent? 
A That is right. 
Q Of either G Iasser or Kaplan to sell the property? 
A That is correct. 
MR. PARKER: What was the date of the sale? March 
the 8th? 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
BY MR. GLASSER: 
Q You were aware, were you not, of the judgment of 
Glasser and Kaplan? 
A I was aware of that judgment and other judgments. 
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Q And what was the amount that was due and owing to 
Richard S. Ruffin who was the holder? 
A Richard W. Ruffin. 
Q The holder of this $4,000 note at the time of the 
foreclosure? 
A Nothing had been paid on account of the note and the 
principal amount and all interest from the date of the note was 
due on that note. There are no credits on the .back as you can 
see. 
MR. GLASSER: That is all. 
MR. PARKER: Is that your case? 
MR. GLASSER: Yes. 
MR. PARKER: I will now examine Mr. Robert- if it 
would be conceded that Richard W. Ruffin is the holder of 
the note. 
MR. GLASSER: I will consent he is the holder of the 
note.of $4,000. 
MR. PARKER: That is all that I want. 
THE COMMISSIONER: You may be excused. 
(Whereupon, the hearing was recessed. After the recess 
the hearing continued as follows:) 
MR. PARKER: I now propose to examine Mr. Robert 
D. Ruffin as one of the defendants in this case. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PARKER: 
Q Mr. Ruffin, you are an attorney at law practicing in the 
city of Norfolk. Will you state for the benefit of this record 
your connection with Richard W. Ruffin who is admitted as the 
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holder of the note secured by the deed of trust to you in- the 
principal amount of $4,000. 
A I and Richard W. Ruffin are practicing in partnership 
under the firm name of Edmund S. Ruffin and Sons. 
Q You are brothers, are you not? 
A Yes. The firm account is signed - the checks are signed 
by either Richard W. Ruffin or Robert D. Ruffin inter-
changeably. 
Q I wish you would state in chronological order just what 
occurred with reference to this loan of $4,000 to Maurice E. 
Collette, and as you proceed with your statement I wish you 
would produce the original documents, copies of which are filed 
with the Answer, and produce in addition any other relevant 
documents that may be in your possession. 
A It should be abundantly clear to the Commissioner and 
to everyone that this was a very unsatisfactory loan. Every year 
since the loan matured we have had incipient foreclosures, 
correspondence with Southern Aid Life Insurance Company, 
Incorporated, and all such foreclosures ·were called off when 
Maurice E. Collette caught up the first mortgage, and we had to 
be content with not losing our security altogether. 
In January of 1967 it came to our attention that the 
City of Norfolk was interested in acquiring the subject property 
as a part of the expansion program for Old Dominion College, 
and through our contacts with Joseph L. Walker, real estate 
agent, and Nicholas Gratakis -
MR. GLASSER: Now, at this point, Mr. Com-
missioner, I want to interrupt Mr. Ruffin to interpose an 
objection that this is not relevant and it is immaterial what 
negotiations might have transpired between the Ruffins 
and Collette and the City of Norfolk, and for the record I 
would like to move that it be stricken. 
MR. PARKER: We think it is material. It is set up in 
our Answer, and we would like to proceed. As I 
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understand the proceedings before the Commissioner, the 
objections are recorded and then the witness answers. 
MR. GLASSER: Now I would like-
THE COMMISSIONER: The Commissioner will re-
serve ruling on the objection until such time that he is 
presented with authorities in support of the positions of 
the~plaintiffs and the defendants. 
MR. GLASSER: So that I might not further interrupt 
Mr. Ruffin, I would just let the record note that my 
objection is continuous to matters that are similar which in 
my opinion is irrelevant, instead of constantly objecting. 
MR. PARKER: We will agree to that. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Proceed. 
THE WITNESS: Will you read back what I said. 
(The reporter read the last answer of the witness.) 
A (Continuing) And Nicholas Gratakis, who had been \ 
employed by the City of Norfolk as an appraiser, we learned \ 
that the subject properties had been appraised for the sum of 
$17,750 and the city was willing to pay said amount for them. 
My brother and I then got in touch with Maurice E. 
Collette and informed him that this purchase money was 
available and insisted that he accept the proposition, and he was 
reluctant so to do hut we pointed out that if we did not sell to 
the city voluntarily the properties might he condemned and we 
might get less. As I say, with some reluctance, Maurice E. 
Collette did consent to sign an option. 
BY MR. PARKER: 
Q Do you have a copy of the option which he signed? 
A And I would like to show the Commissioner an option 
- no, no, not a - the original option which is dated January 24, 
1967 acknowledging that in consideration of one doll~ -
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Q Just a minute before you read it. It will speak for itself. 
This is the document signed by Maurice E. Collette? 
A It is. 
Q And who prepared the option? 
A The City of Norfolk prepared the option. 
Q And do you recognize the signature of Maurice E. 
Collette to it? 
A I do. 
MR. GLASSER: All of this is over my objection. 
MR. PARKER: That is understood. 
MR. GLASSER: On that I mean I object to these 
instruments and to the other evidence which is hearsay. 
MR. PARKER: I might state that we understand that 
there is some controversy here with respect to whether or 
not the property was actually sold free and clear of liens 
and this document calls for delivery of title free of liens, 
and as the case develops it will he apparent that the City of 
Norfolk paid the $17,750 for the property free of liens. 
This is the exact language of the option agreement: 
(Reading) "The undersigned agree to convey said 
property by deed of general warranty with the usual 
covenants of title adequate to convey, and in conveying to 
the City of Norfolk fee simple title to the said property 
the title is to he free of all liens and encumbrances except 
real estate taxes for the current year which shall be 
prorated to the date of settlement and paid by the 
undersigned." 
And we would like to introduce that as Defendants' 
Exhibit L 
THE COMMISSIONER: It will he received as De-
fendants' Exhibit I. 
(Received and marked in evidence by the Com-
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missioner as Defendants' Exhibit Number 1.) 
THE WITNES~: In due course the City of Norfolk 
ex.ercised the option, and I hand you herewith an original 
p~per dated January the 31st, 1967 entitled "Exercise of 
Option," which was prepared by the City of Norfolk and is 
signed by T.F. Maxwell, authorized agent who, of course, 
is the~ City Manager, referring to the option and reciting 
that the city had accepted the option granted to it. 
MR. GLASSER: I have seen it, hut I still have the 
same objection. 
MR. PARKER: We offer that in evidence appropri-
ately to he marked Defendants' Exhibit 2. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Received as Defendants' Ex-
hibit 2. 
(Received and marked in evidence by the Com-
missioner as Defendants' Exhibit Number 2.) 
BY MR. PARKER: 
Q Now, following the acceptance of that option what 
occurred? 
A I then informed Robert B. Holland, assistant city 
attorney representing the City of Norfolk that there were 
judgment liens against Maurice E. Collette and that in order to 
eliminate the same it would be necessary to foreclose the 
property under the terms of the deed of trust to me as trustee. ' 
told Mr. Holland that if the city would agree to hid for sai~ 
property the option price of $17,750 and become the successfu ·\ 
bidder I would undertake to release the two prior deeds of trus 1 
to which proposal the City of Norfolk agreed. ./ 
Q Did you then proceed with the advertisement? 
A I proceeded with the advertisement first telling Mr. 
Collette and I didn't propose to charge over $200 knowing 
~ .. 
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perfectly well that a charge of over five per cent of the amount 
which the equity of redemption was worth would be illegal, 
whereas a charge of under five per cent of said amount would 
be legal, and the fee agreed upon was $200. 
Q Did you receive an acknowledgment? 
A I want it identified. 
Q I am going to ask you now did you receive a writing in 
connection with that statement from Mr. Collette? 
A I did. It is dated March lst, 1967 and signed by him. 
Q Addressed to -
A Me, and I identify his signature. 
(Document shown to opposing counsel for examina-
tion.) 
MR. PARKER: I would like to introduce that In 
evidence as Defendants' Exhibit Number 3. 
MR. GLASSER: The same objection. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Defendants' Exhibit Number 
3. 
(Received and marked in evidence by the Com-
missioner as Defendants' Exhibit Number 3.) 
THE COMMISSIONER: A letter dated March 1st 
addressed to Mr. Robert D. Ruffin signed Maurice E. 
Collette. 
THE WITNESS: I then advertised the property and a 
copy of the advertisement being in the record, and 
pursuant to the terms of advertisement held the sale on the 
date stated. 
BY MR. PARKER: 
67 
Q Did you make any statement before the sale, before 
the property was offered for sale with reference to liens on the 
property? 
A Before offering the property for sale I announced that 
each of the. two properties sold, 1407 West 46th Street and 
1409 West 46th Street was~bject to a ~ de~d of txu.st peld 
by Southern Aid Life Insurance Company, Incorporated, and 
at I would a off and release each of the said deeds of trust 
. fsaleas ~~r. 
I then offered the property for sale and received the 
one and only bid from the City of Norfolk of $17,750 and 
knocked it down to the city at that figure. 
Q Now, what was the next step in the matter? 
A The next step in the matter was on the same day, 
March 14, 1967. Knowing that the city was bound by its bid I 
went to the Clerk's Office and released the two deeds of trust. 
Q just a minute, just a minute. You have not testified to 
the fact that you took up the deeds of trust yet. 
A Oh, yes. I am in error. I am sorry. On the same day I-
I knew I did something on the same day - I paid off the 
Southern Aid Life Insurance Company, and I have a letter here. 
Q Do you have a copy of a letter forwarding your check 
to the insurance company? 
A That is what I -
MR. PARKER: Here it is. 
(Letter shown to the witness for examination.) 
A The foreclosure date was March 8, 1967, and on March 
8, 1967 having received the payoff from the insurance 
company, I mailed a check payable to Southern Aid Life 
Insurance Company for $13,520.06 because my letter of 
transmittal is dated March the 8th, which I would like to 
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identify. 
MR. PARKER: Which I now offer as a copy of the 
letter which you addressed to H.H. Southhall, president, 
Southern Aid Life Insurance Company, Incorporated, 
Third and Clay Streets, Richmond, Virginia? 
THE WITNESS: It is. 
MR. PARKER: Just a minute. Dated March 8, 1967? 
THE WITNESS: It is. 
MR. PARKER: Just a minute. I would like to intro-
duce that letter in evidence. 
MR. GLASSER: I have no objection to this. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Ruffin, what do you 
mean when you say that you recieved the payoff from the 
Southern Aid Life Insurance Company, Incorporated? 
THE WITNESS: I know- I mean that I should have 
probably introduced a previous letter dated February 22, 
1967 from the insurance company addressed to me stating 
as follows-
MR. PARKER: Just a minute. This is the letter. This 
is the original letter from the insurance company. 
(Document shown to opposing counsel for examina-
tion.) 
MR. GLASSER: I have no objection to that either. 
BY MR. PARKER: 
Q Let me ask you this question. Prior to writing the letter 
just introduced which is marked Defendants' Exhibit Number 4 
- is that correct? 
THE COMMISSIONER: Correct. 
MR. PARKER: And what is the date of that letter, 
March the 8th? 
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THE COMMISSIONER: Dated March 8th. 
(Received and marked in evidence by the Com-
missioner as Defendants' Exhibit Number 4.) 
BY MR. PARKER: 
Q Had you received a letter from the insurance company 
in response to an inquiry from you stating the amount 
necessary to pay off these mortgages? 
A I had, and that letter is dated February 22, 1967. 
Q Signed-
A Signed by H.H. Southhall, president. 
(Letter shown to opposing counsel for examination.) 
BY MR. PARKER: 
Q And is this the original letter? 
A That is the original letter. 
MR. PARKER: I would like to introduce this letter in 
evidence to he marked Defendants' Exhibit Number 5. 
THE ·COMMISSIONER: Received as Defendants' Ex-
hibit Number 5. 
(Received and marked in evidence by the Com-
missioner as Defendants' Exhibit Number 5.) 
BY MR. PARKER: 
Q The date of that letter is February 22, 1967. We return 
to Exhibit 4, which is a copy of your letter to the insurance 
company. 
A On what date? 
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Q Dated March 8, 1967 stating that "I enclose herewith. 
check for $13,520.06 in full payment of your two liens, 1407 
and 1409 West 46th Street, Norfolk, Virginia in accordance 
with your letter of February 22, 1967 as follows: 1407 West 
46th Street, amount due to March 15, 1967, $6,869.83. 1409 
West 46th Street, amount due to March 15, 1967, $6,650.23. 
Total, $13,520.06. Please endorse the two original deeds of 
trust notes for $8,500 each to Robert D. Ruffin for purposes of 
release and let me have the same along with the deeds of trust 
and other loan payers at your earliest convenience. Sincerely 
yours, Robert D. Ruffin." 
Now, do you have a copy of your cancelled check 
enclosed in that letter? 
(Document shown to opposing counsel for examina-
tion.) 
MR. GLASSER: I have no objection to that. 
MR. PARKER: We would like to introduce that as 
Defendants' Exhibit Number 6. 
THE COMMISSIONER: 6. 
(Received and marked in evidence by the Com-
missioner as Defendants' Exhibit Number 6.) 
MR. PARKER: Mr. Ruffin's cancelled check, and that 
is dated-
THE COMMISSIONER: March 8, 1967 to Southern 
Aid Life Insurance Company, Incorporated in the amount 
of $13,520.06, and it is marked for 1407 and 1409 .. West 
46th Street. 
MR. PARKER: $13,520.06. 
THE COMMISSIONER: The check of Edmund S. 
Ruffin and Sons is drawn on the Seaboard Citizens 
National Bank, Norfolk, signed by Robert D. Ruffin. 
BY MR. PARKER: 
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Q Did you receive in response to your request in your 
letter of transmittal the notes secured by the first lien and the 
deeds of trust securing that? 
A Not immediately. The following day they wrote a 
letter dated March 9, 1967 stating that their accountant had 
discovered that there was $28.48 more due on each lien and I 
have a check, cancelled check. 
Q Just a minute. Did you receive any reply to your letter 
enclosing your check, a response from the Southern Aid Life 
Insurance.Company, Incorporated? 
A Yes. 
Q The answer is yes. And you got this letter signed H.H. 
Southhall, dated March 9, 1967 addressed to you. 
MR. PARKER: And I would like to introduce that 
letter in evidence. And that is the letter that calls your 
attention to the fact that there was a mistake in giving you 
the proper amount. 
(Shown to opposing counsel for examination.) 
MR. GLASSER: No objection. 
MR. PARKER: And that there was still owing $28.48. 
BY MR. PARKER: 
Q Did you send the check to cover that deficiency? 
THE COMMISSIONER: Just a minute. The letter 
dated .March 9, 1967 from Southern Aid Life Insurance 
Company, Incorporated to Robert D. Ruffin is received 
and marked as Defendants' Exhibit Number 7. I under-
stand without objection on the part of the plaintiff, 
correct? 
MR. GLASSER: That is correct. 
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(Received and marked in evidence by the Com-
missioner as Defendants' Exhibit Number 7.) 
BY MR. PARKER: 
Q And in response to that letter what did you do? 
A In response to that letter I wrote -
Q Did you send them a check for the difference? 
A Well, don't you want that letter? 
Q It isn't necessary. I have got the cancelled check. 
A Very well. I sent that cancelled check. 
MR. PARKER: For $28.48, and I now present a copy 
of the cancelled check and ask that that be introduced in 
evidence. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Received as Defendants' Ex-
hibit Number 8. 
(Received and marked in evidence by the Com-
missioner as Defendants' Exhibit Number 8.) 
THE COMMISSIONER: Check in the amount of 
$28.48 drawn on Seaboard Citizens National Bank. 
MR. PARKER: Twenty-eight dollars how much? 
THE COMMISSIONER: Forty-eight. By Edmund S. 
Ruffin and Sons signed by Richard W. Ruffin, 1409 West 
46th Street, Maurice E. Collette. 
THE WITNESS: In reply to that letter and check I 
received another letter from Southern Aid Life Insurance 
Company. 
BY MR. PARKER: 
Q This letter to which you refer is a letter dated March 
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13, 1967 addressed to Robert D. Ruffin and acknowledging 
receipt of the two checks, $13,520.06 and $28.48, and 
enclosing one deed of trust note in the original sum of $8,500; 
2, deed of trust; 3, insurance policy; 4, real estate tax 
statement. Then with respect to 1409 West 46th Street, deed of 
trust note in the original amount of $8,500, deed of trust dated 
October 16, 1961, insurance policy, and the City of Norfolk 
real estate taxes. 
I would like to introduce that in evidence. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Received as Defendants' Ex-
hibit Number 9, as I understand, without objection. 
MR. GLASSER: (Nodding head affirmatively.) 
BY MR. PARKER: 
Q Now, do you have the notes and deeds of trust referred 
to by the writer of the letter last mentioned in response to that 
request? What is your answer to that? 
A My answer to that is that on March 14 I made marginal 
releases-
Q Just a minute. You have gotten ahead of my question. 
A What is your question? 
Q Do you have the deeds of trust and notes referred to in 
the insurance company's letter to you? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q Are these the documents referred to? 
A These are the documents referred to. 
MR. PARKER: We want to introduce in evidence a 
deed of trust dated October 16th, 1961 from Kensie 
~ilverman and Dorothy M. Silverman, husband and wife, 
to j.E. Hall, Jr. and H.H. Southhall, trustees, securing to 
Southern Aid Life Insurance Company, Incorporated, 
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Richmond, the principal sum of $8,500, attached to which 
is the note referred to in the deed of trust made by the 
makers of the dee~ of trust in that amount, and second a 
d~ed of trust dated November 2nd, I96I from Robert H. 
Crews, unmarried, to J.E. Hall, Jr. ~d H.H. Southhall 
conveying the property numbered 1407 West 46th Street 
to the same trustees in trust to secure Southern Aid Life 
Insurance Company, Incorporated, $8,500, attached to 
which is a note described in the deed of trust for the 
amount of $8,500 signed by Robert H. Crews, and we ask 
that the notes and deeds of trust notes referred to be 
introduced in evidence marked respectively Defendants' 
Exhibits 10 and 11. 
THE COMMISSIONER: The deeds of trust and note 
signed by Kensie Silverman and wife dated October 16th, 
1961 is received as Defendants' Exhibit 10. The note 
mentioned by· Mr.· Parker attached to the deed of trust 
from Robert H. Crews with the note which it secured 
attached, dated November 2nd, 1961 is received as 
Defendants' Exhibit II with or without objection.· 
MR. GLASSER: Well, without objection, but the 
overall objection as you remember. 
THE COMMISSIONER: All right. 
(Received and marked in evidence by the Com-
missioner as Defendants' Exhibits 10 and 11, respectively.) 
MR. STUART GLASSER: Objection on relevance. 
BY MR. PARKER: 
Q Mr. Ruffin, an examination of the note secured by the 
deed of trust discloses that it has a perforation marked 
cancelled marginal release 3/14/67, W.L. Fred, Jr., Clerk. Who 
to your knowledge accomplished that release? 
A I made the release. 
Q As to both notes? 
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A As to both notes. 
Q On the date mentioned in the cancellation stamp? 
A Yes, March 14. 
Q Did you have those notes in hand prior to receiving a 
check from the City of Norfolk for the purchase price? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And do you have any documentary evidence indicating 
the date that the city delivered its check for the purchase price 
to you? 
A Yes. I have a letter from Robert B. Holland, assistant 
city attorney, dated March 14, 1967 reciting: "I hand you 
herewith City's check in the sum of $17,750 for the purchase of 
property owned by Maurice E. Collette, premises designated 
1407 - 1409 West 46th Street. It is understood that you will 
pay off and release the two deeds of trust recorded in the 
Clerk's Office of the Corporation Court in Deed Book 879,at 
Page 545, and Deed Book 881 at Page 147 as shown in the title 
report of Mr. J. Alfriend, III, a copy of which was furnished 
you." That is signed by Robert B. Holland. 
MR. PARKER: Now, I would like to introduce that in 
evidence. 
MR. GLASSER: Now, this one I will object to. 
THE COMMISSIONER: The letter of March 14, 1967 
addressed to Mr. Robert D. Ruffin signed by Robert B. 
Holland, assistant attorney, to which plaintiffs object is 
received in evidence and marked as Defendants' Exhibit 
12. 
MR. GLASSER: My objection is based on the ground 
that it is irrelevant and immaterial and hearsay. 
THE COMMISSIONER: The Commissioner's position 
is the same as he stated earlier. He expects the parties to 
furnish authorities in support of their respective positions 
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in reference to the materiality of these matters to which 
the plaintiff has objected. 
MR. PARKER: I have a complete memorandum 
which I will hand the Commissioner when we argue the 
case. I expect to argue it today. Don't you? 
MR. GLASSER: No, I do not. I didn't know what 
your evidence was. You can submit your brief. I didn't 
come here to argue today. I came here to get the 
testimony and submit a brief at a later time. 
MR. PARKER: It doesn't matter to me. We can argue 
it now or whatever you like. I will give you a copy of my 
memorandum and leave a copy with the Commissioner and 
you can argue it later. 
MR. GLASSER: I will be delighted when I get your 
memorandum to submit mine, but I didn't come here for 
that purpose. 
MR. PAKRER: That is all right. That is all right with 
me. Let me get back to this. 
(Received and marked in evidence by the Com-
missioner as Defendants' Exhibit Number 12.) 
THE WITNESS: Don't you think -
MR. PARKER: just a minute. Have we introduced the 
deed to the city? 
THE WITNESS: No, he did. 
MR. PARKER: It's already introduced? 
MR. GLASSER: The foreclosure deed? 
MR. PARKER: The deed has already been introduced 
in evidence. 
BY MR. PARKER: 
Q But when did you deliver your deed to the city? 
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A I deliv.ered the deed to the city - not the deed of 
correction but the deed contemporaneously with receiving the 
check from Mr. Holland and his letter of transmittal. My 
recollection is I went to the office of the city attorney. 
Q Well, that takes care of that. Now, whose money paid 
the insurance company for the prior liens? 
A The money of Richard W. Ruffin, because he held the 
second lien and it was important for· him to be willing to put up 
additional money to protect his security. 
MR. GLASSER: I object to that as stating an opinion 
and being irrelevant too. 
BY MR. PARKER: 
Q Do you know of your own knowledge -
MR. GLASSER: And hearsay. 
BY MR. PARKER: 
Q - whose money that was? 
A I do. 
Q And whose money was it? 
A The money of Richard W. Ruffin. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Parker, there is no copy 
of the deed from Mr. Ruffin as trustee to the city in the 
record. 
MR. PARKER: I thought there was, and also the deed 
of correction. 
THE COMMISSIONER: You are correct. 
MR. PARKER: That is the certified copy. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Plaintiffs' Exhibits l and 2. 
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MR. PARKER: just give me an opportunity to review 
some things here. 
BY MR. PARKER: 
Q Now, you filed a report of this foreclosure with the 
Commissioner of Accounts, did you not? 
A I did, William L. Ward. 
Q Do you have a copy of that? 
A I do. 
(Document shown to opposing counsel for examina-
tion.) 
MR. GLASSER: I object to that. Of course my 
objection is on the grounds that that is not the first report 
that was filed. 
THE WITNESS: Excuse me. 
MR. PARKER: just a minute, just a minute. 
THE WITNESS: Excuse me. I would rather give him 
this one than that one. It is the same except the. proof-
William L. Ward, Commissioner of Accounts . 
. MR. PARKER: Well, that is immaterial whether it 
was. But of course the record speaks for itself. But you can 
use that if you like. It has no bearing on the matter in this 
controversy. 
l\'IR. GLASSER: I object on the grounds that it is a 
self-serving statement and on the ground that there is 
another report prior to this, unless the defendants propose 
to put all the reports in the record. 
MR. PARKER: Mr. Commissioner, I submit that that 
statement, the last statement relating to another report is 
something that is not in this record and it may or may not 
be brought out by opposing counsel on cross-examination 
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if ·he so desires, and Mr. Ruffin can then answer any 
questions that he might have with respect to it. This is the 
report filed by the Commissioner of Accounts as evidenced 
by his stamp on it. 
THE COMMISSIONER: The account of the sale under 
deed of trust recorded in Deed Book 936, Page 25 held on 
March 8, 1967 marked approved, William L. Ward, 
Commissioner of Accounts, Corporation Court of the City 
of Norfolk, is received and marked Defendants' Exhibit 13 
with the objection of the plaintiffs noted. 
(Received and marked in evidence by the Com-
missioner as Defendants' Exhibit Number 13.) 
MR. PARKER: Now before closing our testimony I 
would like to have a brief conference with my client. 
THE COMMISSIONER: Very well. We will recess. 
(The hearing was recessed. After recess the hearing 
continued as follows:) 
MR. PARKER: All right, witness with you. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GLASSER: 
Q Mr. Ruffin, you have been practicing over how many 
years? 
A That is a hard question. Thirty-seven. 
Q Thirty-seven. And most of your practice or a sub-
stantial part is in the real estate field, is it not? 
A That is correct. 
Q Now, you introduced into evidence, or I introduced an 
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exhibit of the foreclosure ad of this property. You sold the 
property, did you not, in accordance with the foreclosure ad? 
A I did. 
Q Well, the foreclosure ad did not state that you were 
selling it subject to any prior deeds of trust, did it? 
A No, it was sold free and clear of liens. 
Q And the check from the city of Norfolk in the amount 
of $17,750 was given to you as Robert D. Ruffin, trustee, was it 
not? 
A Yes. 
Q Now-
A I don't remember whether I put the word "trustee" 
after my name. 
Q Well, you sold it as trustee for $17,750, am I correct? 
A I received one check from the city. 
MR. PARKER: We admit that this was a payment to 
the trustee. I think we are just quibbling on this now. 
MR. GLASSER: All right. 
BY MR. GLASSER: 
Q Now, you submitted as Defendants' Exhibit Number 
13 what purports to be a report that was filed by you with the 
Commissioner of Accounts on this sale. Is this the only report 
that you filed? 
A It is the only report that I filed. 
Q I hand you herewith a report purportedly signed by 
you in connection with this sale and ask you whether or not 
you forwarded this to me as a copy of your report on this sale? 
(Document shown to opposing counsel for examina-
tion.) 
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MR. PARKER: I have no objection. 
A I did. 
BY MR. GLASSER: 
Q Well, did you or not file this with the Commissioner of 
Accounts? 
A I did not file it because I talked to Mr. William L. Ward 
and we concluded that it would he clearer to file the account 
which I did file with the notations contained thereon instead of 
the account which I contemplated filing. 
Q Well-
A That account has never been filed. 
Q Well, you advised me however, by letter, did you not, 
that you had filed it? 
A No, I advised you I proposed to file it. 
Q You advised me that you proposed to file it, is that 
correct? 
A That is what I think I sent to you. Let me see that 
letter. 
Q Just a second. First let me introduce this, what 
proposes to he a report filed by you in evidence as a plaintiff 
exhibit. 
(Received and marked in evidence by the Com-
missioner as Complainants' Exhibit Number 8.) 
BY MR. GLASSER: 
Q Now, I show you, Mr. Ruffin, a letter addressed by you 
to Bernard Glasser, to me, on March the 15th, 1967 in which 
you state that "I enclose a copy of my trust account which I 
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have this day filed with William L. Ward, Commissioner of 
Accounts," and so forth, and ask you whether or not it was not 
in that letter that you sent me the copy of the report as shown 
by Exhibit Number 8? 
(Shown to the witness.) 
A The account that you have just filed, it was my 
intention to file the account which you had just introduced, but 
I changed my mind when I saw that it would be clearer to the 
Commissioner and to the court to set the account up in a 
different form and the information in the accounts are 
identical. 
Q Why was it necessary to change the account from 
which you had originally forwarded and prepared to mail. What 
caused you to change it? 
A Conversation with William L. Ward, who is Com-
missioner of Accounts, and whose judgment I respected. 
MR. GLASSER: I would like to introduce this as 
Complainants' EXhibit 9, the letter from Mr. Ruffin to 
me. 
THE COMMISSIONER: The letter just mentioned by 
Mr. Glasser is received as Complainants' Exhibit Number 9. 
(Received and marked in evidence by the Com-
missioner as Complainants' Exhibit Number 9.) 
BY MR. GLASSER: 
Q About thirty or more years of experience as an 
attorney in these transactions, why was it necessary for you to 
speak or get advice from Mr. Ward in connection with this sale? 
MR. PARKER: That question is argumentative. He 
has given his reasons for changing it and it certainly is 
unnecessary for counsel to argue the propriety of it. 
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BY MR. GLASSER: 
Q Was that change made subsequent to my exceptions 
filed with you and with the Commissioner of Accounts, if you 
recall? 
A I don't recall, but I do recall that I received a 
communication from you of some sort that put me on notice 
that you did not think that I had sold the property properly. I 
admit that. 
MR. PARKER: I have no objection. 
BY MR. GLASSER: 
Q Did you receive from me letters under date of March 
15 and 16 relative to your handling of this foreclosure? 
A I received each of those two letters. 
MR. GLASSER: And I introduce this as Com-
plainants' Exhibits 10 and 11. 
THE COMMISSIONER: The letter dated March 15 is 
marked as Complainants' Exhibit 10. The letter dated 
March 16 is received as Complainants' Exhibit 11. 
(Received and marked in evidence by the Com-
missioner as Complainants' Exhibits 10 and 11 re-
spectively.) 
MR. PARKER: What is the date of the first letter? 
THE COMMISSIONER: March 15th is the first letter, 
and March 16th is the second letter. 
MR. PARKER: 1967? 
THE COMMISSIONER: 1967. 
MR. PARKER: And the March 16th letter is the 
second letter. 
MR. GLASSER: These letters are copies of letters, the 
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originals of which Mr. Ruffin has for the record. 
THE COMMISSIONER: That he stated he received. I 
understand. 
BY MR. GLASSER: 
Q It was only after receipt of these letters,is it not true, 
Mr. Ruffin, that your report with the Commissioner was 
changed? 
A The Commissioner has reported to the court that only 
one account was filed with him and the court approved the 
same, and you had filed exceptions to the same, which 
exceptions were one day to have been heard hut were not heard 
because of an in~onvenient date and because you had decided 
to put the matter in a court of equity. 
Q Well, that is not responsive to my question. I asked 
whether or not -
A You used the word "changed," and if only one account 
was filed a change could not have been made is the reason for 
my saying as much as I said. 
MR. PARKER: Mr. Commissioner, it seems to me that 
we are just getting into a squabble over a matter that is 
entirely irrelevant. There is no substantial difference 
between the two reports as you will see from examining 
them. The same information is contained in each, and this 
is simply a red herring to divert your attention from the 
real situation. I don't think -
MR. GLASSER: Judge, you are either arguing the case 
or excepting. I think I am perfectly within the propriety. 
MR. PARKER: I mean if we are going to start into a 
rankle of this sort I think we better adjourn for lunch and 
come hack. 
MR. GLASSER: It will take just one question. You 
are questioning the propriety of my questions. 
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MR. PARKER: I object to the questions because they 
are argumentative and have to do with matters that are 
completely irrelevant to the issues. 
BY MR. GLASSER: 
Q Mr. Ruffin, let me ask you. I think we can move along 
quickly and consummate it. The deeds of trust, the two deeds 
of trust your office paid off to Southern Aid, is that correct? 
A That is correct. 
Q You paid those deeds of trust off rather than selling 
the property as trustee with the consent and assent of Southern 
Aid, isn't that correct? You never received an assent or consent 
from Southern Aid to sell this property, did you, prior to its 
sale? 
A Has the letter from Southern Aid been introduced? 
Q You introduced it, yes. 
A Well, that answers your question. 
Q That is all the correspondence or communications that 
you had with Southern Aid prior to the foreclosure, am I 
correct? 
A Yes, that is correct. 
MR. GLASSER: That is my case. 
MR. PARKER: All right. Mr. Commissioner, I stated 
that I would leave my memorandum, and here is a copy 
for you and one for the Commissioner. 
MR. GLASSER: This is off the record. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
(Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned.) 
-----oOo-----
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CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF VIRGINIA: 
CITY OF NORFOLK, to-wit: 
I, James M. Robertson, Commissioner in Chancery, certify 
that the foregoing depositions of Maurice E. Collette, Stuart D. 
Glasser and Robert D. Ruffin, were duly taken and sworn to 
before me at the time and place, and for the purpose in the 
caption mentioned. 
Given under my hand this _______ day of March, 
1969. 
Is/ James M. Robertson 
Commissioner in Chancery. 
The cost of this Deposition is $91.25 
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APPELLANTS' EXHIBIT NO. 1 
1802 
THIS DEED, Made this 8th day of March, 1967, by and 
between ROBERT D. RUFFIN, TRUSTEE, as hereinafter mentioned, party 
of the first part, and the CITY OF NORFOLK, a Municipal corporation 
of the State of Virginia, party of the second part: 
- WXTNESSETH: That1 WHEREAS, by deed dated May lO, 1963, 
duly recorded in the Clerk's Office of the Corporation court of 
the City of Norfolk, Virginia, in Deed Book 936, page 25, Maurice 
E. Collette, unmarried, did convey unto the said Trustee, the pro-
perty hereinafter mentioned and described, in trust to secure to 
the holder thereof the payment of one certain negotiable promissory 
note in the principal sum of Four Thousand ($4,000.00) Dollars, and 
in said deed of trust fully described, and 
WHEREAS, default was made in the payment of the indebt-
edness secured by the said deed of trust and the said Trustee was 
requested by the holder of said note to make sale of the said pro-
perty at public auction in accordance with the terms and conditions 
of said deed of trust, and 
WHEREAS, the said Robert D. Ruffin, Trustee, in the 
performance-of his duties as such Trustee, did offer said property 
for sale, free and clear of liens including. taxes through March 8, 
1967, at public auction in front of the We.st door of the Courts 
Building, 100 St. Paul's Boulevard, Norfolk, Virgin·ia, on March 8, 
1967, at twelve o'clock noon, after haying first given notice of the 
time, place and ter.ms of sale for at least five days by advertise-
ment 1n the Virginian-Pilot, a newspaper published in the City of 
Norfolk, Virginia, at which sale the said party of the second part, 
being the last and highest bidder therefor, became the purchaser of 
--.!....!1 ______ ..._ __ ~--- ··-
---- --------- ---···---~ , ---·---1!:' ..... - ~~.._.._, ..... ~ .,-., .. _..., ....... ,.., 
of which sum was paid to the said Trustee to be administered 
under the terms of said deed of trust, the said Robert D. Ruffin, 
Trustee, doth hereby grant and convey, free and clear of all liens 
including taxes through March 8, 1967, with special warranty, unto 
the said party of the second part, the following prope~ty, to-wit: 
Parcel la All those certain lots, pieces or 
parcels .of land, with the buildings and improvements· 
thereon, numbered 1407 West 46th Street, in the City 
of Norfolk, Virginia, ·known, numbered and designated 
as Lot 27 and the eastern 15 feet of Lot 28, in 
Block 104, on the plat of The Investment Company 
of Norfolk, duiy recorded in the Clerk's Office of 
the Circuit court of Norfolk county, Virginia, in 
Map Book 3, at_page 76: said lot and part of a lot, 
taken as a whole, front 40 feet on the soutb side 
Qf 46 h Street (formerly 42nd Street), and run back 
n parallel lines 100 feet. 
arcel 2: All those certain lots, pieces or 
s of land, with the buildings and improvements 
n, numbered 1409 West 46th Street, in the City 
folk, Virginia, known, numbered and designated 
29 and t~e western 10 feet of .Lot 28, in. 
104, on the Plat o~ the Investment Company of 
Norfo k, duly recorded in the Clerk's Office of the 
Circuit Court of Norfolk County, Virginia, in Map 
Book 3, at page 76. Said lot and part of a lot 
take as a whole front 35 feet on the south side 
of 4 th Street (formerly 42nd Street) and run·· back 
betw en parallel lines 100 feet. 
It being the same property conveyed to the said 
Robe t D. Ruffin, in trust as aforesaid. 
·he two deeds of trust aforementioned held by Southern 
Aid Life I surance company, Incorporated, Richmond, Virginia, 
which were liens on the said property at the time of said sale 
and were paid off and released by the said Trustee subsequent to 
the sale, are as follows: 
1. Deed of.Trust dated November 2, 1961, from 
Robert~. crews to J. E. Hall, Jr., and H.H. Southall, 
Trustees, recorded in the cler~•s Office of the 
corporation court of the city of Norfolk, Virginia, 
in Deed Book 881, page 147, on Parcel 1 above was 
to secure a certain note for $8,500 •. 00, upon which 
there was a balance owing of $6,894.39. 
2. Deed of Trust dated October 16, 1961, from 
Kensie Silver and Dorothy M. Silver, husband and 
wife, to J.E. Hall, Jr., and H.H. Southall, Trustees, 
recorded in said Clerk's Office, in Deed Book 879, 
page 545, on Parcel 2 above was to secure a certain 
note for $8,500.00, upon which there was a balance 
owing of $6,666.15. 
WITNESS the following signature and seal: 
_ ___,__...,£k6"""' ........ i>~P.~.JJ."""" :_' <'--. __ (SEAL) 
Robert D. Ruffi~ustee 
APPELLANTS' EXHIBIT NO.2 
2058 
THIS DEED OF CORRECTION, Made this 20th day of March, 
1967, by and between ROBERT D. RUFFIN, TRUSTEE, as hereinafter 
mentioned, party of the first part, and the CITY OF NORFOLK, a 
Municipal Corporation of the State of Virginia, party of the 
second part: 
WITNESSETH: That, WHEREAS, by deed dated May 10, 1963 
duly recorded in the Clerk's Office Of the Corporation Court of 
the City of Norfo.lk, Virginia, in Deed Book 936, page 25, Maurice 
E. Collette, unmarried, did convey unto the said Trustee, the 
property hereinafter mentioned and described, in trust to secure 
to the holder thereof the payment of one certain negotiable 
promissory note in the principal sum of Four Thousand ($4,000.00) 
Dollars, and in said deed of trust fully described, and 
WHEREAS, default was made in the payment of the indebt-
edness secured by the said deed of trust and the said Trustee was 
requested by the holder of said note to make sale of the said 
property at public auction in accordance with the terms and 
conditions of said deed of trust, and 
WHEREAS, the said Robert D. Ruffin, Trustee, in the 
performance of his duties as such Trustee, did offer said property 
for sale, free and clear of l~ens including taxes through March 8, 
1967, at public auction in front of the West door of the courts 
Building, 100 St. Paul•s Boulevard, Norfolk, Virginia, on March 8, 
1967, at twelve o'~lock noon, after having first given notice of 
the time, place and terms of sale for at least five days by adver-
tisement in the Virginian-Pilot, a newspaper published in the City 
of Norfolk, Virginia, and before offering the said property for 
sale the said Trustee d1d announce ehat each of the t~parcels 
of property was subject to a prior deed of trust held by Southern 
Aid Life Insurance Company, Incorporated, Richmond, Virginia, and 
that he would pay off and release each of the same out of the 
proceeds of sale as the Agent for the purchaser, at which sale 
the said party of the second part, being the-last and highest 
bidder therefor, became the purchaser of said property for the 
111!11••""' -of: C!.e~t.~P.e~t.'l'll+.e~t..e~t.'l'll """-··---A ~ ....... -.- H•·-A-.-.A ~.1 .1:.&.. •• 1~, ~ ~~n nn\ """'-,, ---
tnereon, numbered 1407 west 46th Street, in the City 
of Norfolk, Virginia, known, numbered and designated 
as Lot 27 and the eastern 15 feet of Lot 28, in 
Block 104, on the plat of The Investment company 
of Norfolk, duly recorded in the Clerk's Office of 
the Circuit court of Norfolk County, Virginia, in 
Map Book 3, at page 76: said lot and part of a lot, 
t~ken as a whole, front 40 feet on the south side 
of 46th Street (formerly 42nd Street), and run 
back between·parallel lines 100 feet. 
parcel 2: All those certain lots, pieces or 
parcels of land, with the buildings and improvements 
thereon, numbered 1409 west 46th Street, in the city 
of Norfolk, Virginia, known, numbered and designated 
as Lot 29 and the western 10 feet of Lot 28, in 
Block 104, on the Plat of the Investment company 
of Norfolk, duly recorded in the Clerk's Office of 
the Circuit court of Norfolk county, Virginia, in 
Map Book 3, at page 76. Said lot and part of a lot 
taken as a whole front 35 feet on the south side of 
46th Str~et (formerly 42nd Street) and run back 
between parallel lines 100 feet. 
It being the same property conveyed to the said 
Robert D. Ruffin, in trust as aforesaid. 
WITNESS the following signature and seal: 
__ _,._g~~~~~1f_...../),IAM.I .. wah.~"""-·; ___ (SEAL) 
Robert D. Ruf~LTrustee 
STATE OF VIRGINIA 
CITY·OF NORFOLK, to-wit: 
I, Alice c. Butler, a Notary Public in and for the 
City and State aforesaid, hereby certify that Robert D. Ruffin, 
Trustee, whose name as such is signed to the writing above, 
dated March 8, 1967, has acknowledged the same before me in 
Given under my hand this Q~ • .J day of March, 196 7. 
My commission expires: April 11, 1969. 
·::- __ Notary Public 
'?ORM APPROVED: 
. f' .4 , p) t.;?L_~ / ;' .~~~ .... 4?,;.;.,-;;;;;_~ .. 
AliT. crrv ATr~,.,~IY · 
J7JRGINIA: 
In the Clerks Office of the Corporatzon G'ou1·t oj the City t~/ 
NOt"jolll. on the /lfJ-L day of~-- .. J9l, 1 ,,t /1:..55/lM. 
This Deed was this day received and upon cerli(i,·ate 
of acknowledgment, thereto annexed. admitted to raord. 
TESTE: W. L. PRIEUR, .Jr., Clerk 
BylGAw4, e. WtiA4 'AA:K44&/D.G 
A CQPY, TESTE: KATHERINE V. ~~5~erk 
. ~~~~~~~c 
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APPELLANTS' EXHIBIT NO.4 
·-
lltrgtnta: 
In the Clerk's 0:/fice of the Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk, on the ... ?..~~-----··----· 
day o/. .... :~?:.~-~---------------·--···------·-··19 .. ?.? __ 
~.f. q. Kaolan and Bernard Glasser 
--···· ...... --···· ---- .. -------.-----------------------------------------------------.--------------- -- ----·- ................. ---------
------ ····-----·--..... _ ...... _______ ·····--- _________ -----·---·-- ______ ----·· _________ -----···· --··--_ -----·------ ___ Plt. 
against In .. ------·-····------·····-
Mauriee E. Collette 
721 Brambleton Avenue 
Norfolk, Vir~inia 
-------- ___ -----· .... _ ----_ ....... ---- ----·· ------------·--··· _ ---------·· __ ...... ·---....... --------.......... ----·---Df t. 
Judgment in favor of the plaintiff _______ _ 
against the defendant .... ________ ------------------------ ___ ... ____________ --------.... ______ ----------- _______ ------ ______ ... _________ ------ ___ _ 
for _____ ~~-!~-~. -~-h .9. ~-~-~ !?-.9 __ --~-~ Y.~n-.. h~.n~t~~~t __ f.9.~_t_y_ .. QD.e.:-: ::.:::: -~.:-.:-. ::::.:::: _ ~- ~-~-:: -~-~:: __ Dollars, 
and ...... f.Q~~.Y~_Qn~---------------------cents, ( $ .. 7.,.14.1 .. 41---------------------------), with interest thereon to 
be computed after the rate of six per centum per annum from the ________ l_e_t _______________________________ day 
-· 
nlus t774.14 .Attorney's fees 
of--~-~-~~~~-~-~------------·-··-··--------19.~?. ___ , till paid/ and $ .. ?:?.!_g2___________ Costs. HOMESTEAD WAIVED 
Subject to a credit of ......... ----------- ______ -~-?-~~-------.-·---------------·-------------------···-···---- ...... -- .......... ------------
The above judgment was secured in the ... ~-~~!~---~-~---~-~-~---!!:~ ___ g_~~E:~-~~l .. 9.~~Y. ... «?.f. ___ ~~!'.!:~1k 
------------------ ______ ------------ ____________ on the .. l.B:th ________ day of------~~P.~~-~~:1-_______________________ , 19 __ (?_f:> __ • 
Judgment docketed the .. ----~-~~-~----------------day of----------~-Ei'-~~-~!!t~I'---------------------, 19 .. 9.9.. in 
. 4~ 2Q8 Judgment Book ____________________ , Page ____________________ . 
lM-8-57-B&G 17733 
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APPELLANTS' EXHIBIT NO.6 
49<J7 Ql~tS lttit, Made this, the. ............. J.Q:!;.~-.. -.............. day of.·--··-····--·····Ma~y--·-·-·--• in the year 
nineteen hundred and:.!.!.!:~.l.::.~.~.~.~.tJ.9.~.3..P._., between. ......... ·-··-·-·····-----·--····---··········· .............................. . 
...... _ ................................................ ; ........... ~VR.lJi.~ ... ]!t~. ..... C..Q.~.L~~~J ...... ".om.@U.!.,g~ ............ - .. ~ ............................................... .. 
.......... ·-···-·····--··-····--····--··· .. ···············-·················-··········-·······-······· .................................... ·····························-·····-········ .................................. .._ .. _ ........ ,_ 
of the. .............. Qj..u:__of ..... _ ... _ .... - ... - .. ~k ,Ja the State of ........... Y..!.r..sJ.P.-.!! ............ . 
hereinafter called Grantors, part.L .... of the first part an<L.J.i.Q.lmH~.D .. ,__,R.W....F.I.N ..... Qf .... tJl~ ...... _. 
. _ ... Q.+.!Y-~~-· Nor r.~!£,_.lli..s.!.~.!~...a. ......... -, Trustee ....... _. .. , part..J.. ..... of th.e s~nd_p@rt. 
Bttatraart~, that the said part .. J:, ..... of the first part do ... th. grant unto the said Trustee ............ , the 
following property,to-wlt: 
PARCEL 1: All those certain lots, pieces or 
parcels or land, with the buildings and' improvements 
thereon, numbered 1407 West 46th Street, in the City 
of Norfollt, Virginia, known, numbered and designated 
ss Lot 27 and the eastern 15 feet of Lot 28, in 
Block 104; on the plat of The Investment Company 
or Norfolk, duly recorded in the Clerk's Office or 
the Circuit Court of Norfolk County, Virginia, in 
Map Book 3, at page 76; said lot and part of a lot·, 
taken as a whole, front 40 feet on the south side 
or 46th Street (formerly 42nd Street), and run 
back between parallel lines 100 feet, 
PARCEL 2: All those certain lots, pieces or 
parcels of land, with the buildings and improvements 
thereon, numbered 1409 West 46th Street, in the City 
or Norfolk, Virginia, known, numbered and desig-
nated as Lot 29 and the western 10 feet of Lot 28, 
in Block 104, on the Plat of the Investment Company 
or Norfolk, duly recorded in the Clerk's Office of 
the Circuit Court ot Norfolk County,·Virginia, in 
Map Book 3, at page 76. Said lot and part or a lot 
taken as a whole frOnt 35 feet on the south side of 
46th Street (formerly 42nd Street) and run back 
between parallel lines 100 feet. 
It being the same property conveyed to th• 
said grantor by Robert H. Merriman and Alma 
Merriman, ·husband and wite, by deed ot even date 
herewith, to be herewith recorded, this deed a.r 
trust being given to secure a part of the pur-
chase price and to be treated as part of one and 
t·ha same transac-tion. · 
Parcel 1 is subject to a prior deed of trust dated 
November 2, 1961, recorded in the Clerk's Office or 
the Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk, Virgin~a, 
in Deed aook 881, page lh7, from Robert H. Crews, un-
married, to J. E. Hall, jr., and H.H. Southhall, 
Trustees, to-secure a certain note tor $8,5oo.oo. 
P•roel 2 is subject to a prior deed or trust dated 
September 28, 1961, duly reeorded in •aid Clerk's 
ottice, in Deed Book 879, page S4S, trom Kensie Silver 
and Dol'.othr M. Silver, husband and wlte, to J. E. 
Hall, Jr.., and B.B. Southball, Trustees, to aeoure 
a certain nota tatt J8 .. (oo .. o·o ... 
sem1-annuall7, waives the homestead exempt1oD and 1a alao oounter•1sned 
on the marg.in b7 the aaid ·Trustee tor the purpose ot turtber 1dent.1t1cat1c 
Said note contains on its face a provision that same will be ex-
tended rr·om month to month on the P&Jlllent ot tsoo.oo each month 011 
iccount or principal until paid in tull. 
It being understood that If more than one note or bond Ia aecured hereby they lhall, 11111 .. 
otherwise herein stated, be aecured ratably accordll\f to the reapecti~e amounts without priority 
of one over the other. 
And also to eecure the payment of any note Ol' notes, bond or bonds, that may be aiven In re-
newal or curtail, in whole or in part, of the above deacribed debt; and apon the further trust that 
the said Grantors may remain in quiet and peaceable pouesaion of the· above described premiaeiJ, 
and take the profits thereof to their own uae, until default be made in the payment of the debt 
aforesaid, in who•e or in part, or in any• renewal· thereof, or of the Interest thereon 88 the aame 
shall fall due, or in the observance ·of any covenant herein contained, or in the payment of any deed 
of trust or lien which may be prior hereto, or in the observanc.e of any covenant therein contained; 
and upon any such default being made, then the entire debt herein secured, retnafniDg unpaid, shall, 
at the option of any holder thereof, and without notice to the Grantors, Immediately become due and 
payable, and the said Trustee shall, so soon thereafter as he shall be requested by any creditor here-
by secured so to do, sell the above granted property at public auction, at such time and place, and 
upon such tel'l1l;S and conditi~ns as he may deem expedient, including the requirement of a bidder's 
deposit of $100.00 or in Trustee's discretion of a larger sum not exceeding 10% of the amount 
hereby secured from each bidder before his bid is received, after having first given notice of such 
time, place ·and terms of sale for at least five days by advertisement in one or more newspapers 
published in the City af Norfolk, Virginia and out of the proceeds of such sale, after paying all 
the expenses attending the execution of this trust, including commissions on said proceeds of sale 
to the daid Trustee at the rate of five percent, shall pay to the holder or holders thereof, as their 
interest or interests may appear, the debt aforesaid, with interest thereon, or so much thereof as 
may then remain unpaid, and the balance, if any, to be said Grantors or their assii"JlS. 
And the said Grantors covenant that they wiU, during the con~lnuance of this trust, and at 
their own proper costs and charges, keep Insured the bufldfnrs upon the aforeaaid lot or parcel of 
land against casualties by fire; and if so requested by the Trustee, against casualties or loss by 
reason of war, windstorm or any other cause or risk, in some good solvent insurance company, or 
companies, app.roved by said Trustee in a sum not less than .... ~ .... F..Q.~_.fh.a.uaancl ....... ~ ....................... . 
................... ::: ......................................... :: ........................................ ': ... Dollars, and assign .. the policy or. policies of insurance 
thereon to the said Trustee, who shall hold the same as. additional security for the payment of the 
debt aforesaid : and if the said Grantors shall fall to keep the said buildings insured as aforesaid, 
then the said Trustee may, jn addition to the right to require~ a sale for breach of covenant, as 
ahove provided, cause the same to be insured at the expense of the said Grantors, and the premium 
of such insurance, shall be a charge upon the trust property aforesaid : and in ease any money be· 
comes payable under such. Insurance policy, or policies, the said Trustee may colleet the same and 
distribute the amount so collected and be entitled to commissions thereon as If It were the proceeds 
of a sale had under this deed. 
The Grantors further covenant that they wlll pay all taxes, levies and a8sessmenta imposed 
upon said property ao long 88 thfs trust ahalllast, and exhlblt'reeelpta ahoWiq such payments 
when required by said Trustee, and In default thereof, the safd Trustee may pay the same, and the 
cost thereof, with Interest thereon, shall 'be a charp upon the ~t property aforesaid. 
In event of any default hereunder and for the duration thereof the Trustee aha11 be entitled 
to, and may collect and hold for the payment of the debt hereby secured,. any and all rent then 
owing or thereafter accruing from the use and occupancy of the property herein conveyed. 
The said Grantors hereby consent and asree that the debt hereby secured,- or any part thereof, 
may be renewed or extended beyond maturity as often_!& may ~ desired by agreement between 
the creditor and· any subsequent owner of the property,-iml no such renewal or extenalon shall In 
any way affect the Grantors' responsibiUty as surety or otherwise. 
The said Grantors covenant that they wm. keep the property hereby conveyed In pod repair; 
that no waste shall be suffered, or nuisance permitted upon said property; that they wm pay the 
debt hereby secured in the manner provided; and that they wfD not permit or auffer the said prop. 
erty to be advertised and sold under any subsequent deed of trust or other Junior Uen. . . 
The said Grantors covenant that they will warrant gen~rally the property hereby conveyed, and 
do hereby waive the benefit of their homestead exemption aa to the aforesaid debt and obU .. tlon; 
and as to this contract. 
It is further understood and qreed that the word "Gruton", wherever Uled herein, shall be 
construed to mean, and shall Include, the party or parties of the flrat part, whether one or more 
than one and whether individual or corporate, and their hairs, personal representatives, succeuora 
. . 
and assigns. 
It is further understood and agreed, that In the event of the payment of the debt aeeured 
hereby, these presents shall be released by a deed of releaae to be prepared and recorded . at the 
expense of the Grantors. 
APPELLANTS' EXHIBIT NO. 7 
TRUSTEE'S SALE 
No. 1407 West 46th Street 
No. 1409 West 46th Street 
Pursuant to the terms of a certain deed of trust dated May 
10, 1963, recorded in the Clerk's Office of the Corporation 
Court of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, in Deed Book 936, Page 
25, from Maurice E. Collette, to the undersigned Trustee, 
default having been made in the payment thereby secured and 
at the request of the creditor secured, I shall sell at public 
auction in front of the West door of the Courts Building, 100 
St. Paul's Boulevard, Norfolk, Virginia, on 
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 8, 1967, 
AT 12:00 O'CLOCK NOON, 
the following property, to-wit: 
Parcel 1: All those certain lots, pieces or parcels of 
land, with the buildings and improvements thereon, 
numbered 1407 West 46th Street, in the City of Norfolk, 
Virginia, known, numbered and designated as Lot 27 and 
the eastern 15 feet of Lot 28, in Block 104, on the plat of 
The Investment Company of Norfolk, duly recorded in the 
Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of Norfolk County, 
Virginia, in Map Book 3, at page 76; said lot and part of a 
46th Street (formerly 42nd Street), and run back between 
parallel lines 100 feet. 
Parcel 2: All those certain lots, pieces or parcels of 
land, with the buildings . and improvements thereon, 
numbered 1409 West 46th Street, in the City of Norfolk, 
Virginia, known, numbered and designated as Lot 29 and 
the western 10 feet of Lot 28, in Block 104, on the Plat of 
the Investment Company of Norfolk, duly recorded in the 
Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of Norfolk County, 
Virginia, in Map Book 3, at page 76. Said lot and part of a 
lot taken as a whole front 35 feet on the south side of 
46th Street (formerly 42nd Street) and run back between 
parallel lines 100 feet. 
TERMS: Cash. A deposit of $500.00 will be required of 
the successful bidder and settlement to be made within 10 days. 
ROBERT D.RUFFIN, 
Trustee 
